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Abstract
The analysis of the effects of heterogeneity on aggregate economic
outcomes has seen a resurgence in the recent macroeconomic
literature. The exponential increase in computer power over the
last decades has allowed researchers to solve ever more complex
theoretical models with meaningful heterogeneity along various
dimensions, while at the same time bringing ever more granular micro-
level data to the table when testing the model predictions.
This thesis explores two varieties of this recent vintage of models
of heterogeneity. The first part of the thesis investigates the
implications for wealth distributions of combining the standard life-
cycle incomplete markets model of household consumption with
income processes featuring heterogeneity in individual-specific growth
rates, which households can learn about over the course of their
working life. To this extent, first the recent literature on partial
insurance and models of wealth inequality is reviewed. Then,
income processes with profile heterogeneity are estimated from PSID
and BHPS data. The results confirm the findings of previous
studies that allowing for profile heterogeneity significantly lowers the
estimated persistence and innovation variance of persistent shocks
to household income, and documents substantial variation in the
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estimated parameters of the income process across time periods and
measures of household income. The estimated income processes
obtained are then used in a quantitative model of household
consumption and saving in order to investigate the implications for the
model predictions on the wealth distribution. The model is calibrated
to empirical wealth distributions obtained from the SCF and the BHPS,
and it is shown that the inclusion of individual-specific growth rate
heterogeneity in income severely deteriorates the model’s ability to fit
the shape of the data. Comparative statics exercises are performed
to identify the drivers in the model’s failure to match the empirical
profile of wealth holdings, which show that it is precisely the two
key parameters which differ between the standard AR(1) model and
the heterogeneous profile model, the persistence and variance of the
permanent shock to household income, which drive model fit. The
second part of the thesis looks at heterogeneity on the production side
of the economy and its implications for international trade. Following
an existing approach in the literature, we develop testable implications
of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model of trade, in which firms
differ in their productivity and have to make production and exporting
decisions in the face of costs to trade. Applying an estimation strategy
previously used in the literature, we find weak support of the model’s
predictions in data for 64 manufacturing industries in the NAFTA
member countries Canada, Mexico and USA. We then test additional
model predictions by constructing a measure of entry conditions by
industry based on firm turnover, which allows us to divide our sample
5
into fixed and free entry industries. Furthermore, we include the
effects of third country tariff barriers on the relative performance of
two trading partners’ industries. While the results are broadly in line
with model predictions, we find some evidence of violations of the
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Distributional questions are increasingly making a comeback in economics. In
spite of the famous – or infamous – warning of Lucas (2004) that the focus
on questions of distribution is one of the most ”seductive (...) and poisoning”
tendencies in economics1, many fields of economics that have long relied on
simplistic models of representative households and firms have increasingly taken
the issue of modelling heterogeneity across economic agents seriously. At the
very least since the Great Recession triggered by the financial crisis of 2007–
2008, issues of distribution have also taken centre stage in the public economic
discourse. Work on the increase in income inequality, especially at the top end of
the income distribution, and the rising inequality in wealth holdings in advanced
1In fairness it has to be said that Lucas’ quote is often taken out of context, as he was not actually
advising against studying distributional issues entirely, but merely pointing out that economic
growth has played a much more important role in raising people out of poverty than re- distribution
of current resources at any point in time could have achieved.
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economies has played a prominent role in the public debate in recent years, the
most prominent recent example being Piketty (2014), a rare instance of a book
largely based on economic scholarship being widely discussed and sold (if maybe
not read) by a mainstream audience. However, while the public has only recently
started to take an interest in issues of inequality and distribution, the economic
literature has been developing quantitative models of heterogeneity for almost
three decades. Seminal papers such as Imrohoruglu (1989), Huggett (1993),
and Aiyagari (1994) laid the groundwork for a vast literature explicitly modelling
the choices of heterogeneous agents based on microeconomic evidence. A major
factor in the move towards models of explicit heterogeneity has been the huge
advancement in computer power in recent decades. With Moore’s law still holding
to this day, the transistor count of the fastest microprocessor today is about two-
thousand times as high as that of the fastest microprocessor twenty-five years
ago, when Zeldes (1989) published one of the first works that numerically solved
a household savings problem under uncertainty numerically. Besides enabling
researchers to numerically solve ever more complex optimisation problems with
state spaces of ever more dimensions, the advancements in computer power have
also vastly improved data processing capabilities, a development that in turn has
led to a surge in empirical work exploiting large microeconomic data sets, the
results of which can then be used to evaluate models of household and firm
behaviour.
The present work explores heterogeneity in two different classes of economic
models, using both approaches outlined above. While the first part will build
up towards a quantitative theoretical model of the wealth distribution, the merits
of which will be evaluated against micro survey data, the second part will take the
14
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predictions of a micro-founded model of international trade and test them on data
of firm behaviour disaggregated at the industry-level.
1.2 Outline
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the research on
theoretical models of the household wealth distribution in the last two decades.
It will highlight the key empirical challenges by presenting stylised facts on
the cross sectional wealth distribution using the most recent wave of the UK
Wealth and Asset Survey as an example. Then, the workhorse model of the
literature on household savings decision, the incomplete markets life-cycle model
of consumption, is briefly reviewed along with recent work on partial insurance in
this model. Then, extensions of the model which help it match the stylised facts
of empirical wealth distributions are reviewed.
Chapter 3 builds on the discussion in Chapter 2 by estimating income processes
with profile heterogeneity for different sub-periods of PSID data from 1968 to
2013 and from BHPS data in order to assess the stability of the cross-sectional
variance of income growth rates across time and income measures. The estimates
are then used in chapter 4 as inputs in a structural model of household saving
first employed by Guvenen (2007), which is calibrated to the empirical wealth
distribution using a minimum distance estimator. After discussing the model
fit, comparative statics exercises are performed on all parameters of the income
process, the upper and lower bounds of which are taken from the universe of
estimation results from chapter 3, to understand which parameters are most
important for the model fit.
15
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Chapter 5 gives a brief introduction into trade models based on firm-level
heterogeneity, before developing an estimable model in the spirit of Chen et al.
(2009). The model is then tested on a data set of prices, productivity, and markups
for 64 manufacturing industries in the Canada, Mexico and the United States over
the period of 1988 to 2010. In an extension of the approach of Chen et al. (2009),
a sub-sample analysis is conducted in which the observations are split into fixed
and free entry industries, based on a measure of firm turnover developed on the
basis of prior research.




Quantitative Models of the Wealth
Distribution
2.1 Introduction
The distribution of wealth and income has recently made a comeback to the
centre of economic discourse in advanced economies. The ongoing rise of income
inequality, observed since the early 1980s especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, has
received renewed attention in the public sphere since the financial crisis started
taking its toll on living standards across the world. At the same time, the best-
selling book by Piketty (2014) led to a surge in interest in the role of capital in
the economy, and, by extension, the distribution of wealth, both in the academic
literature and the popular press.
While the broader public has only recently picked up on the issues arising around
income and wealth distributions, they have sat squarely in the centre of many
sub-fields of economics for a long time. The income distribution has long been of
17
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interest to labour economists trying to understand the forces shaping the evolution
of earnings in the labour market, while at least the accumulation of aggregate
wealth plays a central role in macroeconomic models of economic growth. This
chapter, as well as chapter 4, focuses on the intermediate step that takes us from
an income to a wealth distribution - economic models of household saving. When
attempting to build a model of the wealth distribution, the first step of course
is to get an understanding of the object we want to model. To this end, this
chapter starts by presenting stylised facts of the wealth distributions in advanced
countries and discusses some of the limitations of the data available. It then
builds a simple life-cycle model of consumption and savings to guide the following
discussion and fix notation. Using this basic model, different savings motives and
their importance in the context of aggregate wealth accumulation are discussed.
Following this, the role of income uncertainty and market structure is examined
in more detail.
2.2 Stylised facts
The most notable and consistent fact that emerges when looking at wealth
distributions across all countries and different time periods is that wealth is
highly unevenly distributed, much more so than income. Vermeulen (2014)
argues that wealth holdings are so concentrated, that even surveys employing
designs that feature oversampling of richer households (such as the US Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF), or the British Wealth and Asset Survey (WAS))
underestimate the percentage share of wealth held by the top percentile of the
wealth distribution by anywhere from one to five percentage points, while surveys
18
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that don’t oversample underestimate the share by up to ten percentage points.
Keeping this in mind, figure 2.1 presents evidence on household wealth from the
most recent wave of the WAS, which surveyed over 20,000 British households in
the years 2010 to 2012. The first thing that becomes obvious from the figure is the
very unequal distribution of wealth. While households in the lowest two deciles
hold virtually no wealth apart from physical wealth, which includes possessions
such as vehicles and furniture, wealth holdings grow exponentially when we move
up the distribution, with the top decile holding twice as much wealth as the
ninth decile. It is important to note that in producing these aggregate numbers
and figures, one necessarily has to make decisions on how exactly to construct
and aggregate measures of wealth, which will have to be kept in mind when
comparing model predictions with empirical numbers. If the goal is to account
for all productive capital in the economy that can be used in production, a
measure of total net wealth aggregating all forms of asset and debt classes, and
including some durable consumption goods such as cars. When thinking about
the role of wealth in helping the household to smooth out income fluctuations, it
might be more appropriate to exclude very illiquid assets such as housing, and
look more closely at the role of debt for households which might be at their
borrowing constraint and are thus vulnerable to reductions in their borrowing
limit, even though their net wealth (including illiquid assets) is positive. Finally,
important questions are raised by the existence of various government and private
pension schemes, which have to be factored in when constructing measures of
a household’s lifetime resources, but whose exact value might be uncertain (for
the case of defined contribution plans) and not well understood by households
themselves. Figure 2.1 makes clear that this is a non-trivial issue, as implied
19
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Figure 2.1: Histograms and cdfs of household net wealth in different data sets.
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pension wealth is a significant portion of household portfolios.
2.3 A workhorse model
The basic model underlying the discussion of savings behaviour and wealth
accumulation in this chapter is the life-cycle model of household behaviour dating
back to Modigliano and Brumberg (1954) 2. The model can be written as a single
household solving the problem
2A more detailed treatment of the general class of models can be found both in Browning and
Crossley (2001) and in Attanasio and Weber (2010), although both papers have their focus on













at+1 = (1 + r)(at + yt − ct) (2.2)
where T is the last period of the planning horizon, δ is the subjective discount
factor, u() is the instantaneous felicity function – usually assumed to be of
the CRRA form, c
1−σ
1−σ , where σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion –, c
is consumption, a are financial assets, which allow the household to transfer
resources across time, r is a one-period interest rate, and y is income. z is used
as a stand-in variable denoting the fact that households might, in general, care
about other things that are not captured by the concept of current consumption;
examples would be habits or durable consumption (which break the time-
separability of the utility function), leisure time, particular classes of assets (such
as housing) or bequests left to future generations. While in general, T → ∞ is a
possibility, and infinite horizon versions – first advocated by Friedman (1957) –
of the life-cycle model are widely used in macroeconomic applications, the finite
horizon model will be more useful for the following discussion and forms the





When trying to understand wealth distributions through the lens of the model
outlined above, the key question is: why do households save? The basic model,
in which consumers only care about the time path of instantaneous utility derived
from consumption, suggests that households will save if and only if it leads to
preferential allocation of consumption over time. If the utility function exhibits
curvature, as the standard CRRA utility function does, households will prefer a
smooth consumption path over time. As Browning and Crossley (2001) point out,
consumption smoothing can happen at different frequencies, depending on the
exact set-up of the model. In Modigliano and Brumberg (1954) the main reason
saving was the existence of a retirement period, which necessitates consumption
smoothing over the life cycle – wealth accumulation during working life to pay
for consumption in retirement. The implication of this simple model is that
wealth accumulation on the household level solely depends on the length of the
retirement period, while in aggregate wealth accumulation crucially hinges on
the growth rate of the economy. The crucial assumption that allows Modigliani
and Brumberg to focus on consumption smoothing over the life cycle was that of
constant income, an assumption that is obviously incorrect and easily rejected by
the data. We will therefore next discuss the implications of introducing income
fluctuations, which will make consumption smoothing at shorter frequencies
necessary, into the basic model.
22
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2.5 Income uncertainty and market structure
With the assumption of a non-constant income stream, it becomes important
to think about the opportunities households have to insure themselves against
these fluctuations, or, in other words, which market structure they are facing.
To make income fluctuations relevant for the economic agent, the world of
complete markets, in which a full set of Arrow securities covering each possible
state of the world can be bought and sold, has to be abandoned in favour of
market incompleteness. The most convenient, and at the same time most extreme,
departure from the complete markets assumption is to assume away any sort of
insurance markets except for very simple self-insurance through risk- free one-
period bonds. This market structure is implicit in the formulation of the consumer
problem in equation (2.2) – there is just one asset for the household to sell
or buy, and this asset has a certain payoff in the following period, which is
not contingent on the state of the world. The big advantage of this setup is
tractability: simple models of this kind can often be solved analytically, and in
recursive formulations of more complex problems, the simple market structure
only adds one state variable to the problem. The drawback, obviously, is that
this market structure is at odds with the economic reality, where households are
able to buy a host of different assets that vary widely in liquidity as well as in
the degree to which payoff are state-contingent. We defer the consideration of
the role of liquidity to section 2.6, which deals with the largest asset in most
households’ portfolio, housing, and examine the role of insurance first. The basic
idea when investigating the extent to which households have access to insurance
mechanisms is to analyse the joint dynamics of income and consumption data,
23
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and compare them with the implications derived from models with different
insurance mechanisms. In a complete market setup, where households can fully
insure income risk, idiosyncratic changes in income should not translate into
changes in consumption, implying a flat profile of cross-sectional consumption
inequality over the life- cycle, irrespective of the underlying stochastic process
governing income. This is not the case in the absence of insurance opportunities,
with the opposite end of the model spectrum being inhabited by the Aiyagari-
Bewley-Hugget-Imrohoroglu class of models (Aiyagari (1994), Bewley (1977),
Huggett (1993), Imrohoruglu (1989)). These model don’t feature any insurance
possibilities apart from non-contingent one-period bonds and also deliver specific
predictions on the relationship between income, consumption and savings3. The
precise predictions of the model for how households will consume and save
depend crucially on the specification of the stochastic process governing income
uncertainty – essentially the object over which E in equation (4.1) is defined.
When applying an income process consisting of permanent and transitory shocks
to this model, the well-known4 result of the model is that consumption should
react to permanent changes in income, while transitory changes in income should
be buffered by saving and dissaving in the noncontingent bond. This prediction of
the model is exploited by some authors to elicit information on the decomposition
of income changes into permanent and transitory shocks using consumption data:
assuming that the model is correct, increases in income inequality in the data that
are accompanied by contemporary increases in consumption inequality must be
3More precisely, the opposite end of the insurance spectrum would be a world that does not
even offer noncontingent bonds, although this market structure is obviously not suited to examine
any interesting economic question.
4For a rigorous derivation refer to your favourite Macroeconomics textbook, e.g. Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2012), chapter 17.
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induced by permanent shocks to income, while changes in the income distribution
that do not lead to changes in the consumption distribution can be seen to be the
consequence of transitory shocks. Blundell and Preston (1998) is an example of a
paper employing exactly this strategy to examine data on consumption and income
from the British Family Expenditure Survey to examine the properties of changes
in the income distribution in Britain between 1968 and 1992. One problem
of these studies however is a large literature documenting ”excess smoothness”
of consumption in the data, that is showing that consumption does not change
one-for-one even with changes in income that are known to be permanent (a
very detailed account on the early research on this can be found in Deaton
1992), implying that there are at least some insurance opportunities available
to households in the real world. Based on the rejection of both full and no
insurance in the data, an active literature has developed trying to quantify the
amount of insurance households have access to. Blundell et al. (2008) develop a
novel imputation procedure designed to alleviate measurement problems in PSID
consumption data to test the degree of partial insurance. Their estimates imply
that households are almost perfectly able to insulate consumption from transitory
shocks, as a standard Bewley model would predict, but, in contrast to the model
predictions, also that around 40% of permanent shocks to income can be insured
against. Kaplan and Violante (2010) examine to what extent the empirical
estimates of consumption insurance that Blundell et al. (2008) obtain can be
replicated in a standard incomplete market model with capital as the only savings
vehicle. They find that the model replicates the high degree of insurance against
transitory shocks, but fails to generate enough insurance against permanent shock;
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a version of the model with a natural borrowing constraint5 generates an insurance
coefficient of 22%, while one without borrowing only delivers 7% insurance6.
They also show that the model generates too much insurance for older workers
and too little for younger workers, which, just as the importance of the role of
borrowing constraints, is consistent with the empirical finding in Blundell et al.
(2008) that insurance coefficients are much higher in a sample of high wealth
households compared to a sample of low wealth households. All of this suggests
that in order to accurately assess self insurance in a quantitative model, it is
important for the model to capture the wealth accumulation adequately, as wealth
holdings might significantly change the insurance options of households, even if
that wealth was accumulated for reasons entirely different from the self-insurance
motives present in the simple incomplete markets model.
2.6 The role of housing
One important component of household saving for which the motives to
accumulate it are more complex than a simple self-insurance model would
imply is housing. As figure 2.1 demonstrates using data from the most recent
British Wealth and Asset Survey, by far the largest share of household portfolios
is invested in housing wealth, with the notable exception of the very richest
households. Similar portfolio allocations can be observed for all advanced
5This is one of the loosest possible borrowing constraints commonly used in the literature, it
implies that households can borrow up to the capitalised value of the income stream until the end
of life that would obtain if they were hit by the worst sequence of income shocks possible.
6 The results can loosely be interpreted as indicating that with a natural borrowing constraint,




economies, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) for example show that
households between the 30th and 80th percentile of the wealth distribution
hold in excess of 60% of their total assets in housing wealth7. The illiquidity
of housing, the high transaction costs and the consumption element of housing
purchases make this asset fundamentally different from the one-period riskless
bond considered in our workhorse model, and imply that it offers only very limited
insurance opportunities against short-term income fluctuations. Furthermore,
housing differs from other assets in that it also offers the household housing
services, that is an investment in real estate is at the same time the purchase
of a durable good. Hence, the introduction of housing into our simple model
above does not only mean a departure from having a simple asset at in equation
(2.2), it also means having an additional consumption good which does not perish,
possibly altering the households utility function in equation (2.1), if the utility
derived from the housing good is of a different form that that derived from
instantaneous consumption. A number of authors have considered the effects
of allowing households to save in housing assets in addition to financial assets.
Yang (2009) constructs synthetic cohorts to examine consumption data from the
CEX in tandem with asset allocation data from the SCF and documents diverging
consumption patterns over the life-cycle for housing compared to non-housing
goods. She also shows that wealth accumulation is markedly different for home
owners compared to renters, with home owners holding much more wealth in
retirement than non-owners, in contrast to the predictions of a simple life-cycle
7It is noted that there is notable variation in the share of wealth accounted for by housing
wealth across countries, although it is the largest component for every country. As discussed
above, the treatment and valuation of government pension schemes can also have a significant
effect on estimates of portfolio allocations.
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model. She also shows that a model which includes housing services in the
utility function and features borrowing constraints coupled with downpayments
for housing purchases (which prevent many agents from accumulating housing
wealth early in life) and transaction costs in the adjustment of the housing stock
(which slows the decumulation of housing assets at the end of life) can match
the key empirical facts. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) present an
argument along similar lines and build a model with endogenous borrowing
constraints in which durable consumption goods (which can be seen as housing)
act as collateral. Here, the model predicts accumulation of durable goods early in
life, with high consumption of nondurables and accumulation of financial assets
later in life, in line with the data. Iacoviello (2008) considers a similar model and
shows that the presence of housing assets in the model can lead to a decoupling of
the joint evolution of cross-sectional consumption and income inequality that was
at the heart of the literature identifying permanent and transitory income shocks
from precisely this relationship. This again highlights the crucial importance
of getting the mechanisms driving households’ wealth accumulation right if one
wants to draw conclusions about the risk households are facing from quantitative
models of household consumption and savings.
2.7 Closed and open economies
One key decision when building a model of wealth accumulation is the question of
how the interest rate on savings is determined. Traditionally, the macroeconomic
literature has viewed the interest rate as an endogenous parameter, pinned
down by the marginal product of capital from the economy’s production function
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and the quantity of capital available, which in turn is governed by household’s
savings decisions. In fact, the main contribution of the seminal work by Aiyagari
(1994) was to highlight the effect of idiosyncratic income risk and borrowing
constraints, two key features of the heterogeneous agent models most frequently
used to examine questions related to the wealth distribution, on the steady
state interest rate. Aiyagari shows that compared to a standard growth model,
the steady state stock of capital in a closed incomplete markets economy is
higher, and, correspondingly, the steady state interest rate is lower because of
precautionary savings induced by income uncertainty. However, allowing for
an endogenous interest rates introduces additional complexity into the model
as the determination of the interest rate requires asset market clearing, which
implies that household savings choices have to be consistent with each other
in each period. For many modern life-cycle models which feature large, high-
dimensional state spaces, this additional computational burden might make the
model solution infeasible. For these reasons, many researchers have opted for
treating the interest rate as an exogenous parameter, set anywhere between three
(Cagetti, 2003) and 5.2 (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002) percent. Whether this is
justified will depend on two things: theoretically, one has to ask whether general
equilibrium effects are likely to alter the answer to the question at hand, while
empirically the question of how high the elasticity of the interest rate to changes
in aggregate wealth is will determine how problematic omitting this feedback
mechanism from the model is. In general equilibrium models in the tradition of
Aiyagari (1994), this elasticity is given by the sensitivity of the marginal product
of capital to the quantity of aggregate capital, which can be determined from the
production function. While the Cobb-Douglas function is the function of choice in
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the literature (see e.g. Castaneda et al. 2003), recent work by Piketty (2014) casts
doubt on the appropriateness of this assumption and argues for a functional form
implying a lower elasticity of the interest rate to increases in the capital stock.
Irrespective of the choice of the production function though, one has to ask how
valid the assumption of a closed economy, in which household savings have direct
impacts on the quantity of productive capital in the economy, is. Given the deep
international integration of modern financial markets, it appears that the open
economy assumption often used in international economics to describe economies
that can not set interest rates might be useful when thinking about the dynamics
of interest rates in response to changes in saving behaviour in the local economy.
Davies et al. (2007) show that even the US as the economy with the – by far –
largest net wealth holdings only accounts for around 30% of global net wealth.
This suggests that any excess negative or positive asset holding in an economy for
which the asset market clearing condition does not hold locally can be absorbed
by global financial markets. Indeed, Bernanke (2005) famously argued that a
”global savings glut” was sustaining large US current account deficits, suggesting
that global financial markets allow even the largest asset market in the world to
not clear for extended periods of time. These considerations motivate us to opt for
an exogenous interest rate in chapter 4.
2.8 Wealth Distribution Papers
In the last years, many authors have used the possibilities offered by the increase
in computing power to derive an additional implication from the broad class of
incomplete market models outlined above: a simulated wealth distribution. While
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there are many practical difficulties in creating model outputs that can reasonably
be compared to the data collected in surveys (some of which have been alluded
to in the above discussion on the definition of wealth), in principle the simulated
wealth distribution derived from life-cycle models can be used to calibrate deep
parameters of the model, provide an additional test for how well the model is able
to capture household savings behaviour, and shed light on which mechanisms
are crucial in driving the evolution of aggregate savings at different parts of the
distribution.
An early attempt to use the wealth distribution to estimate the parameters of a
life-cycle model of household savings can be found in Cagetti (2003), who uses a
simple model similar to the one outlined in equations (2.1) and (2.2). Important
additions in his version of the model are a bequest motive – which, ceteris paribus,
will increase the wealth holdings of elderly households – and a simplified pension
system, which guarantees each household a pension depending on their education
level, and thereby lowers wealth accumulation during working life. The idea
behind the estimation strategy is simple: given a stochastic process for household
income, the discount rate δ and the risk aversion parameter σ pin down a solution
to the household’s savings problem which allows one to simulate a theoretical
wealth distribution from optimal household behaviour. Therefore, it is possible
to use the simulated method of moments to construct an estimator that chooses
the vector (δ, σ) which minimises the distance between empirical moments of the
wealth distribution and its simulated counterparts. Given the high skewness of
wealth data, Cagetti opts for median wealth by 5-year age group as the moment
to match. As has become clear in the previous discussion, a crucial element
driving household choices in the model is the income risk they face, making the
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choice for the stochastic process representing this risk and its calibration a crucial
step in modelling wealth distributions. Cagetti opts for a process consisting of a
trend growth component common to all households, an age-education component
estimated for CEX data, and an MA(1) process representing the stochastic nature
of income. With his calibration, Cagetti finds low degrees of persistence, with
pronounced heterogeneity across education groups, and high degrees of risk
aversion, implying a significant contribution of precautionary savings to aggregate
wealth.
A very similar exercise is performed by Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011), who
construct a minimum distance estimator based on the shape of the cross-sectional
distribution of wealth at different stages of the life cycle. That is, rather than
simply targeting the 50th percentile of wealth holdings as Cagetti (2003), here
all percentiles of the wealth distribution from 10 to 90 are considered. Increasing
the number of moments to match leads to estimates of the discount factor which
are an order of magnitude more precise than in Cagetti (2003). The estimate
for the discount factor, at δ̂ = 0.985, is at the upper bound of the estimates in
Cagetti (2003), while the estimated risk aversion parameter σ̂ = 1.08 is only a
third to one sixth as large as Cagetti’s estimate, depending on the subgroup under
consideration.
Exercises like the ones by Cagetti (2003) and Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011)
repeatedly come to one conclusion: while a simple life-cycle incomplete markets
model with idiosyncratic income shocks calibrated from income data can match
parts of the wealth distribution well, and generate the correct ordering of
inequality in wealth, income, and consumption – wealth being more unequally
distributed than income, which in turn is more unequally distributed than
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consumption – it fails to capture the extremely high dispersion in wealth,
especially at the top of the distribution8.
A straightforward way of improving the fit of the more standard model is
employing an income process that features large persistent shocks with low
probability, as first popularised by Castaneda et al. (2003). Their specification of
the income process is a four-state Markov chain, the highest state of which is only
reached with very low probability, has a persistence of about five years, and implies
an income 1000 times higher than median income. In this setup, it is evident
that simple consumption smoothing considerations lead to very high savings rates
for rich households, which in turn lead to a large wealth concentration at the
top end of the distribution. It is however questionable to what extent models
relying on this type of income process, which cannot be reconciled with the
evidence from micro-level surveys on household incomes, can be used to inform
policy analysis; a recent example of this problem can be found in the work of
Kindermann and Krueger (2014), who investigate optimal labour income taxation
in an Aiyagari-Bewley-Huggett style model featuring a similar income process and
validating their model by fitting the top tail of the empirical wealth distribution.
Unsurprisingly, they find very high optimal tax rates of around 90 percent on
top earners, however this result is entirely driven by the income process used
and subsequent work by Badel and Huggett (2014) demonstrates that optimal
tax rates are significantly lower if one includes an earnings process based on
human capital formation, which is parametrised to mirror the empirical evolution
8Indeed, this is the reason cited in Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011) for excluding the top
decile of the wealth distribution from the targeted moments: the model has no chance of capturing
the extremely high net worth of the richest households, which exceeds 150 times average yearly
income in the 2007 SCF.
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of earnings dispersion. This shows that a model that fits the wealth distribution is
not necessarily suited for policy evaluation, especially if the good fit is the artefact
of model assumptions that have little empirical support and gives reason to include
more realistic features of the economic environment into the model which might
help to explain observed patterns in the data. A number of researchers have
extended the baseline model in various dimensions, some of which we will discuss
here9.
A more realistic version on the role of the household income process in shaping
the wealth distribution is the inclusion of entrepreneurial activity as an alternative
to labour income. Quadrini (2000) is an early attempt to include business income
in the model. His economy features infinitely lived households, that have the
opportunity to undertake entrepreneurial activity, but need to save up capital in
order to start a business first. After having started the business, these agents
face substantially higher risk than working households, a fact that combined with
high borrowing costs and infinite lives leads to wealth accumulation at the top
of the distribution as large as in the data. Cagetti and DeNardi (2006) improve
on this model by allowing for an endogenous choice in the amount of capital
invested in the business, and in their model the potentially high rates of return
on business activity are the main factor affecting the right tail of the wealth
distribution. This aspect makes their model a close cousin to models that feature
different rates of returns for different asset classes, which we turn to later. Cagetti
and DeNardi (2006) also provide an empirical rationale for the modelling of
entrepreneurial activity, using SCF data to show that amongst the wealthiest 1%
9The discussion here draws on the work by DeNardi (2015).
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of households, 81% are business owners or self employed, although this group
of households only accounts for 17% of all households. They also show that
amongst business owners, mean and median wealth are higher for those not
actively engaged in managing the business, providing support for models that
feature an intergenerational transfer of assets, which we turn to next.
A successful line of research extends the model by moving from a simple life- cycle
perspective to an overlapping generations (OLG) model, in which inequalities
can be transmitted across generations and hence accumulate over time. This
transmission mechanism can work through either assets directly, by adding a
bequest motive to the agents utility function which prevents them from drawing
down assets in old age, or through heritability of human capital in the form of skills
or learning ability. The role of inheritance rose to prominence in the empirical
literature with a dispute between Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), who estimate
that around 80% of total wealth is inherited, while just 20% is the result of life-
cycle saving, and Modigliani (1986), who argues that the role of the sources
of wealth accumulations is exactly reversed. Recently, Thomas Piketty and a
number of co-authors (Piketty 2011, Piketty et al. 2014, Piketty and Zucman
2015) revive this debate using long-run time series from France and drawing
on other work from the UK and Germany, finding large variations in the annual
flow of inheritance as a share of total wealth, but concluding that the overall
importance of inheritance in shaping the wealth distribution is closer to Kotlikoff
and Summer’s estimates than to Modigliani’s. The correct estimation of the role of
inherited wealth is further complicated by the possibility of inter vivos transfers,
which are not captured by inheritance tax data. This point is made forcefully by
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Gale and Scholz (1994), who use data on transfers from the SCF to estimate that
20 percent of aggregate wealth is passed on across generations via inter vivos
transfers (compared to 31 percent as inheritances by their accounting). While the
empirical estimation of intergenerational transfers of financial assets is not entirely
straightforward, the question of the intergenerational transfer of ability is even
more complicated. Researchers have adopted a wide range of specifications for
modelling this transfer, based on models of parental investments in their childrens’
education, or taken the short cut of directly assuming that children receive draws
from productivity distributions, the mean and/or variance of which are directly
linked to the parental realisation of productivity. DeNardi (2004) examines both
bequests and intergenerational transmission of ability in tandem, and shows that
while the model fit is vastly improved by this mechanism, it still misses the very
high concentration of wealth in the top percentile of the wealth distribution.
Another line of work considers the role of preferences in driving inequality in
wealth accumulation. The obvious way to affect the distribution of wealth
through preferences is by letting the discount factor vary across agents, an idea
that finds empirical support in work by Lawrance (1991), who finds significant
heterogeneity in time preferences rates between poor and rich households using
an Euler equation based regression approach on PSID income and consumption
data. The first work to leverage differential discount factors to increase wealth
dispersion in the Aiyagari-Bewley-Hugget framework is the seminal paper by
Krusell et al. (1998), who experiment with three groups of agents exhibiting
discount factors between 0.9858 and 0.993. Even with this seemingly small
dispersion in preferences, the inequality in wealth holdings in the model rises
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dramatically, with the share of wealth held by the richest 1% of households
increasing from three to 24 percent, and the Gini coefficient increasing from 0.25
to 0.82. This finding is corroborated in recent work by Carroll et al. (2014),
who show that a model with a slightly higher dispersion in δ than in Krusell et
al. (1998) can match both the Lorenz curve of net wealth and financial wealth
almost exactly. Cozzi (2014) considers the implications of varying the other deep
parameter in the preference structure, risk aversion. He solves a model in which
the population of agents has a mean risk aversion of 1.07, with a variance of
0.76, and shows that including this dimension of heterogeneity helps the model
fit the data almost as well as the stochastic-delta model of Krusell and Smith,
although it misses the concentration in the top percentile. Importantly, this model
implies a significantly lower discount factor between 0.87 and 0.89 depending
on the calibration. Interestingly, Cozzi combines his analysis with the estimation
of income processes similar to the restricted income processes we will estimate
in chapter 3 for subsamples of the PSID grouped by risk aversion, and finds
significant heterogeneity in the persistence of the permanent shock to income,
estimated at 0.947 for the less risk averse subgroup and 0.935 for the group with
high risk aversion.
Going one step further than simply adjusting the parameters of the standard CRRA
utility function, Diaz et al. (2003) depart from this utility function altogether
and investigate the role of habits in the utility function, first introduced into the
macroeconomic literature by Fuhrer (2000) in the context of a DSGE model of
monetary policy. They show that while habits induce a significant increase in
precautionary savings in the economy, they do not help to bring the model closer
to the empirical dispersion of wealth holdings, and on the contrary lower the Gini
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coefficient compared to a model without habit formation.
As alluded to in the discussion of models with entrepreneurial activity, there is
also a literature that increases wealth inequality predicted by Bewley style models
by allowing for differential rates of return, a feature that finds support in a vast
macro-finance literature on the equity premium puzzle (for a survey see Siegel and
Thaler (1997)), as well as the literature on households’ portfolio choices (Mankiw
and Zeldes (1991) discuss the equity market participation of US households, while
Guiso et al. (2003) review the European evidence). Benhabib et al. (2011) devise
a peculiar model of differing rates of return, where the difference don’t arise
across asset classes, but across generations, with each generation of a household
drawing an idiosyncratic interest rate for its portfolio, which prevails for the
entire span of its life10. Combined with altruism for future generations, this setup
generates a consumption smoothing motive across generations, with generations
of a household that draw a high rate of return accumulating assets to increase
consumption of its descendants. Benhabib et al. also offer some empirical support
for the relevance of heterogeneity in rates of return, citing a standard deviation of
rates of return for housing equity of 14%, and an even higher standard deviation
in the rates of return for business equity, to asset classes which account for 28.2
and 27 percent of total US household wealth, respectively.
Lastly, there might be institutional factors that exert differential influences on
the savings behaviour of different agents. A prominent example of this can be
found in the work of Hubbard et al. (1995), who show that in a model which
10Highlighting the similarities between models of entrepreneurial activity and those featuring
different rates of return, Benhabib et al. motivate the inclusion of stochastic rates of return as an
attempt to capture entrepreneurial risk.
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includes a social security system based on asset-based means testing, something
that can be found in virtually all advanced economies, there is a strong incentive
for poor households not to accumulate any wealth, which increases wealth
dispersion by lowering the wealth holdings at the bottom of the distribution. Other
government programs such as Medicaid in the US might play a role in shaping
the dissaving behaviour of elderly households, which the standard model also
has problems in replicating (see DeNardi et al. (2009) and 2010, DeNardi et al.
(2015)).
2.9 Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of stylised facts about the wealth distributions
in a number of advanced economies and presents various approaches to build
economic models which can account for these stylised facts. It became clear that
while saving for retirement is the main driver of wealth accumulation for large
parts of the population, other factors need to be taken into consideration to explain
the tails of the distribution and the behaviour of young households. Crucial aspects
of an economic model of the wealth distribution are the risks households are
facing – both on the income and the expenditure side – and the financial markets
available to them to insure themselves against those risks and earn returns on their
savings. Finally, the far right tail of the wealth distribution seems to be driven by
factors beyond this, with modelling attempts featuring a vast array of different
ingredients succeeding in matching the distribution of wealth even for the richest
house- holds. Given that vastly different approaches manage to fit the distribution,
it is fair to say that so far there is no consensus on which mechanism is the most
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important one to include, and that all attempts to match the observed dispersion of
wealth based on one of those mechanisms likely overstate the contribution of that
particular mechanism, as so far no attempts at building an overlapping generations
stochastic-beta model featuring differential rates of return, a realistic tax and
benefit system, entrepreneurial activity, intergenerational transmission of financial
wealth and ability, and human capital formation has been made. Some progress
is being made in this direction, e.g. in DeNardi and Yang (2015), who combine
intergenerational transfers of wealth and ability with an income process exhibiting
higher income risk for rich households. Furthermore, virtually all of the papers
discussed in this chapter rely on a variation of a simple AR(1) income process,
ignoring recent evidence on income processes from large administrative data sets,
to be discussed in chapter 3. This means that the implications of heterogeneous
income processes for the wealth distribution are not well understood, a gap in
the literature that 4 will attempt to address. Where a different specification for
the stochastic process governing income risk implies different household saving
behaviour, estimates of additional model parameters (such as, e.g. the strength
of the bequest motive) could, ceteris paribus, be different from those coming
out of models which rely on a standard AR(1) process for household income
risk. Chapter 4 will revisit this question by comparing estimates of preference
parameters – subjective time discount factor and risk aversion – obtained by
matching empirical wealth distributions.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Profile Heterogeneity
on Estimates of Income Risk
3.1 Introduction
As has become clear from the discussion in the preceding chapter, a crucial
ingredient to any model of household savings is an estimate of the risk that
households are facing in the form of their income process. Traditionally,
researchers have relied on a parsimonious AR(1) specification with a transitory
and a persistent shock component, which can be represented as a Markov chain
and thus helps to ease the computational burden. Recent research has cast
doubt on the ability of this specification to accurately capture the risk faced
by households in the labour market though, and advances in computational
capabilities have allowed to solve models with larger state spaces, so that there is
a renewed interest in estimating richer statistical processes for household income.
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The labour economics literature of income processes has long attempted to model
household earnings dynamics using a variety of rich time series models with
different AR and MA specifications. Early attempts to exploit longitudinal data
on household’s income include the seminal work of MaCurdy (1982), who fits
ARMA processes to the income levels of a sample of prime age males from the first
ten waves of the PSID and concludes that the data is best described by either an
ARMA(1,2) or an ARMA(2,1) process; Abowd and Card (1987), who analyse data
from the PSID, the NLS and SIME/DIME and settle for an MA(2) description of
the data as most appropriate. Both MaCurdy (1982) and Abowd and Card (1987)
conclude that the autoregressive component of the stochastic process describing
income residuals has to have a unit root, a conclusion that is called into question
by Baker (1997), who develops econometric tests that reject a specification with
ρ = 1, and favour a specification with what he calls heterogeneous profiles, that is,
an individual specific slope component in the income process. This approach had
been previously applied in longitudinal data on American scientists11 by Weiss and
Lillard (1978) and in data on 279 Swedish scientists by Hause (1980). While these
papers rely on a deterministic structure for individual wage growth over the life-
cycle, Guvenen (2009) offers a model that fuses these approaches, including both
deterministic components for the level and slope of income, as well as a stochastic
AR(1) component delivering persistent shocks. As we will base our analysis on
this model, we defer the detailed model description to the next section.
While most of the work discussed so far has relied on the use of survey data
of income, which is plagued by measurement error and hence cannot correctly
11The National Science Foundation’s Register of Technical and Scientific Personnel, a dataset
comprised of bi-yearly income observations on Ph.D. holders in the STEM fields.
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identify the variance of transitory income shocks, in recent years researchers
have been able to make use of the huge data base of the US Social Security
administration, which offers exact data on incomes of millions of American
workers over long periods of time. The first papers to make use of this data
were Kopczuk et al. (2010), who focus on the evolution of cross-sectional income
inequality over time and the distinction between permanent and transitory shocks
to income, and DeBacker et al. (2013), who use a similar data set of tax returns
to answer a very similar question – we will return to the implications of their
findings for macroeconomic models in chapter 3. More interesting in the present
context is a recent paper by Guvenen et al. (2015), who use the Master Earnings
File of the Social Security administration for the years 1978 to 2010 to construct
an extremely large panel of income observations for a sample of 10% of all US
workers that were issued a Social Security number. From this data set, the authors
conclude that the distribution of income shocks is not normal, with a kurtosis ten-
to fifteen times that of a Normal distribution. Fitting processes similar to that
in Guvenen (2009) to the data, they conclude that the data is best described
by a model including heterogeneity in individual specific growth rates and a
mixture of (at least) two independent AR(1) processes with different innovation
variance. Some more recent papers take the opposite stance though and argue
that profile heterogeneity is in fact not present in the variance-covariance structure
of income data. Hoffmann (2013) uses administrative records from the German
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), which allows to construct
individual-specific earnings histories for up to 120 quarters and is fairly large,
representing a 2% sample of all German salaried employees. Given the structure
of the data, it is possible to control for age and cohort effects better than in the
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PSID, were small sample sizes force aggregation of age groups. Hoffman finds
intercept heterogeneity (σ2α) to be an important feature when trying to fit the data
irrespective across all specification of income processes under consideration, but
argues that heterogeneity in income growth rates becomes insignificant once the
variance of the initial value of the persistent component is adequately controlled
for. Along similar lines, Hryshko (2012) conducts Monte Carlo simulations to show
that if a misspecified heterogeneous income process (HIP) model is estimated
on a synthetic dataset generated from an underlying process with σ2β = 0,
an econometrician will generally find statistically significant levels of profile
heterogeneity. Finally, some authors have attempted to extend the basic ARMA
model in other directions, adding e.g. ARCH effects to capture stochastic volatility
in income innovations (Meghir and Pistaferri 2004), allowing for individual-
specific income processes, rather than simply different means and variances for
the same process (Browning et al. 2010) It is thus fair to say that the literature has
not yet reached a firm conclusion on the correct specification of the income process
households are facing. This chapter will undertake a modest attempt at adding to
the evidence by estimating RIP and HIP processes on different samples of income
data. To our knowledge, this is the first study to use all available waves for the
PSID, ranging from 1968 to 2013, and the first study to estimate HIP processes
from data coming from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS).
3.2 The statistical model
To inform the simulations in the following chapter, this thesis will rely on an
estimated heterogeneous income profiles (HIP) income process in the spirit of
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where yih,t are the log earnings of individual i, who has h years of labour market
experience12 in period t. The function g() is assumed to be a cubic polynomial
in experience, while the individual specific parameters αi and βi – modelled as
random variables with mean zero and variance σ2α and σ
2
β, respectively – capture
the cross-sectional profile heterogeneity. zih,t is an AR(1) process with persistence
ρ and innovation ηih,t, which captures persistent shocks to income, while ε
i
h,t is
a purely transitory shock. Both ηi and εi are mean-zero i.i.d random variables
with variances σ2η and σ
2
ε , respectively. As discussed above, the variances of both
permanent and transitory shocks have seen large swings over the past decades, to
capture this we are allowing for time-variation in the innovation variance (denoted
πt for the innovation to the persistent shock component and φt for the transitory
counterpart).
To estimate the parameters of the model, an equally weighted minimum distance
estimator is used to minimise the distance between the empirically observed
variance-covariance structure of residual earnings (defined as ỹ ≡ yih,t− g(θt,X ih,t)
and the variance-covariance structure implied by the model. In the present
context, this strategy has first been employed by Baker (1997), who estimates
a very similar model to the one described above, although the approach has been
12The definition of h in BHPS and PSID is discussed in more detailed in the following section.
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Guvenen (2009) 0.821 0.029 0.047 0.022 0.00038 -0.23
Baker (1997) 0.423 0.089 – 0.355 0.00081 -0.014
Haider (2001) 0.639 0.057–0.166 – 0.295 0.00041 -0.0083
used before for estimating other models in labour economics, e.g. Abowd and
Card (1987). Table 3.1 summarizes findings of earlier papers. Our model implies
theoretical variances and covariances given by:
Var(ỹih,t) = σ
2
α + 2σαβh+ σ
2
β︸ ︷︷ ︸










α + 2σαβ(h+ n) + σ
2
β︸ ︷︷ ︸+Var(zih,t) + φ2tσ2ε (3.4)
The empirical variance-covariance matrix underlying the estimation will be
obtained by first calculating the covariance of residuals for each age-group in
a given year, and then averaging over all age groups present in a given year.
The theoretical counterpart is obtained by simply calculating the corresponding
variances and covariances from the formulas above, and forming weighted
averages over h with weights corresponding to the relative frequency of age-
groups in the empirical data.
12All codes used in this chapter can be found on my GitHub page: psidJulia for the code used to
merge all waves of the PSID, extract the variance-covariance matrix of residuals and fit the process
using a minimum distance estimator, BHPStools for code that merges the 18 waves of the BHPS
and creates the residual variance-covariance matrix.
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3.3 Data
As we are interested in the variability of our estimates, we are estimating the
process described both on PSID and BHPS data. PSID data has the advantage of
providing a very long horizon (37 waves of data covering a total of 45 years),
which allows for the analysis of sub-periods to examine changes over time. The
BHPS, while more limited in time (18 waves of data covering 18 years) serves as a
useful comparison, while also providing excellent measures of different measures
of household incomes pre- and post taxes and transfers, which we will describe in
more detail below. The data is taken from all available waves of the PSID, that is
years 1968 to 2013 inclusive13. For our baseline estimation, to ease comparisons,
we stick to the sample selection criteria used in Guvenen (2009), namely:
• Household heads between the ages of 20 and 64 inclusive
• Hourly labour earnings between $2 and $400 in 1993 prices
• Hours worked between 520 and 5110
For inclusion in our sample, an individual has to fulfil all of the above conditions
for at least 20, not necessarily consecutive, years. Figure 3.1 shows the sample
size over the entire time horizon.
14. The main variable of interest in the analysis is labour income, for which
we use the series of variables starting with V74 in 196815. Hourly earnings are
taken from the variable starting with V337 in 1968, while hours worked are
13Note that the PSID income variable refers to income in the previous year, so when we talk
about data from, e.g., year 1968, it is implied that we are referring to income in 1967.
14To create the longitudinal data set from the PSID cross-sections, we use the excellent PSIDtools
package (Kohler, 2015)
15A complete list of all variables used is available on my GitHub page.
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Figure 3.1: Size of PSID estimation sample
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taken from the variable starting with V47. To extract the deterministic life-cycle





3. Labour market experience itself is constructed as potential
experience from information on years of schooling.
The BHPS data we are using comes from all available waves, covering the time
period from 1992 to 200816. The raw data is then extended by the derived current
annual and net household variable data set provided by Horacio Levy and Stephen
Jenkins, described in Jenkins (2010). This data set includes information on
household income that takes into account various government taxes and transfers,
both at the individual and the household level. For our purposes, we will use
gross labour income of the household, which is available in the original BHPS
data set; net household labour income, which considers taxes and tax credits,
national insurance contributions, and occupational pension contributions; and net
household income, which adds investment income, pension income, and transfer
income to net labour income. These three variables can be seen to represent
different levels of insurance available to the household: as taxes and (up to a
point) National Insurance contributions in Britain are progressive, they reduce
the variability of the labour income process facing the household, while the
benefits system, which includes housing benefit, job seekers benefits, disability
insurance and various other payments, partially insures household income against
unemployment and other catastrophic shocks. It is therefore expected that these
measures of income imply less risk for the household than gross labour income, an
effect that we will try to quantify below. In addition, we are considering the net
equivalised household income, which uses information on the size of the household
16To merge the BHPS data across waves, we use code provided by Vandendriessche (2015).
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Figure 3.2: Size of BHPS estimation sample
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to equivalise household income using the modified OECD scale. Potential labour
market experience h is calculated from information on the age at which the
household head finished either first or secondary education, which other than
in the PSID is available directly in the BHPS data set. As the time dimension is
notably shorter than in the PSID, we only require households to be in the sample
for five years, and consider up to ten lags for the covariances of residuals. While
previous authors have highlighted the importance of higher order covariances for
identification of HIP processes, our sample sizes unfortunately are so small that
for some cohorts there are less than 10 observations at lags larger than five, so
that considering more lags is impossible. Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the
sample size for the BHPS data set over time.
As for the PSID, we obtain income residuals by regressing each measure of
income on a cubic polynomial in experience, which is constructed from the school
leaving age (or further education leaving age, where applicable). Figure 3.3
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Figure 3.3: Variance of log income and 90/10 percentile width for our sample of
BHPS households









Log gross labour income
Log net labour income
Log net income
Log net income, deflated








Log gross labour income
Log net labour income
Log net income
Log net income, deflated
Variance of different income measures (in logs)
and 3.4 show trends in the variance and the inter-decile range, two widely used
measures of income dispersion, for our selected sample of households. Both
datasets exhibit considerable variation in the dispersion of income over the period
under consideration, which motivates us to include time-varying variances for
transitory and permanent shocks in the estimation.
Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of the residual variance for our PSID sample, after
fitting the cubic polynomial in experience.
3.4 Results
Table 3.3 displays the results for the PSID sample of households. While the
results can be considered to be qualitatively similar to those found in Guvenen
(2009), interestingly the estimated dispersion of individual- specific growth rates
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Figure 3.4: Variance of log income and 90/10 percentile width for our sample of
BHPS households
Figure 3.5: Variance of income residual from regression on cubic experience
polynomial
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Figure 3.6: Log mean income and fitted experience profiles for the BHPS 1992 –
2009
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declines from 0.00031 to 0.00025, a result that confirms the same finding in
Hryshko (2012). Furthermore, the difference in estimated persistence for the
HIP and RIP is much smaller than that reported by Guvenen, and closer to the
values found in Hryshko (2012)17. Table 3.2 shows the results of estimating
both RIP and HIP processes on our sample of households from the BHPS, using
the four different income measures described previously. The results are largely
unsurprising qualitatively, with the variance of persistent shocks declining from
0.1 for the most volatile process (gross labour earnings) to 0.07 for net labour
earnings, to 0.027 for net household income. A similar pattern can be observed
for the transitory shock, declining from 0.08 to 0.07 and 0.056, respectively. The
estimates for the main parameter of interest, the cross-sectional dispersion in
individual specific growth rates βi behaves accordingly, dropping from 0.00032
(consistent with the findings for the main PSID sample in Guvenen (2009)), to
0.00019 and 0.00011. Interestingly, some of the decrease in the parameters that
increase cross-sectional dispersion over the life-cycle of a cohort is offset by a
rise in the cross-sectional inequality in intercepts, Varα rises from 0.036 in the
gross labour income sample to 0.052 in the net household income sample. The
persistence of The most peculiar set of estimates obtains for the deflated and
equivalized measure of net household income. Here, the RIP process shows a
much lower persistence as would be expected, while the variance of persistence
shocks is surprisingly higher than in then in the raw measure of net household
income. The results for the HIP process indicate that the minimization routine
17To ensure broad correctness of our estimation procedure, we also downloaded and ran the
code of Guvenen (2009) along with the original dataset used therein from the journal website.
Unfortunately, we were unable to replicate the results reported in the paper with this code; the
results turn out to be much closer to our results reported here. The author did not respond to
repeated emails asking for clarification.
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hit the boundaries on both σ2β
18 and Cov(α, β). A possible explanation for the
large difference in results compared to all other income processes can be seen in
figure 3.6: as the equivalization largely removes the hump-shape of the experience
profile in the data, the fitted regression line misses the sharp increase in income
at the earliest stage of the life cycle, and instead takes a flat shape over the entire
range. This necessarily implies an entirely different structure of residuals, with
extremely large predicted residuals for the first years of working life. Given this,
we will not consider the estimates for this process in the rest of this thesis19.
3.5 Discussion
Our estimates point to substantial uncertainty over the correct HIP process,
adding to a literature that has found vastly different estimates for all of the main
parameters. Further, we have documented that even applying the same estimation
procedure to different subsamples of the same survey can deliver results that differ
markedly. Lastly, our estimates based on different income measures from the BHPS
underscore the importance of partial insurance when trying to estimate household
income risk from the data. In the next chapter, we will explore the quantitative
implications of these differences for wealth accumulation in life-cycle models with
incomplete markets.
18Which actually has a lower bound of 1e-6, so is not exactly zero.
19For the case of the HIP process this isn’t actually a choice, as the estimated parameters for
σ2β and Covα, β imply a negative-definite variance covariance matrix for the bivariate Normal
distribution from which α and β are drawn, making it impossible to simulate an income distribution
using these estimates.
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Restricted income process: σ2β
!
= 0
Gross labour income 0.925 0.045 0.135 0.0 – –
Net labour income 0.867 0.065 0.077 0.017 – –
Net household income 0.921 0.026 0.046 0.012 – –
Net household income (deflated) 0.817 0.038 0.038 0.084 – –
Heterogeneous income process; σ2β unrestricted
Gross labour income 0.719 0.106 0.080 0.036 0.00032 -0.51
Net labour income 0.808 0.073 0.070 0.032 0.00019 -0.59
Net household income 0.857 0.027 0.056 0.052 0.00011 -0.42
Net household income (deflated) 0.812 0.039 0.042 0.100 0.0 -1.0








Restricted income process: σ2β
!
= 0
1968-1996 sample 0.932 0.010 0.036 0.084 – –
1968-2013 sample 0.920 0.014 0.067 0.076 – –
1968-1986 sample 0.960 0.015 0.061 0.058 – –
1987-2013 sample 0.939 0.017 0.095 0.110 – –
Heterogeneous income process: σ2β unrestricted
1968-1996 sample 0.853 0.013 0.030 0.030 0.00031 –0.30
1968-2013 sample 0.839 0.017 0.064 0.047 0.00026 –0.32
1968-1986 sample 0.885 0.013 0.043 0.110 0.00028 -0.42







The preceding two chapters have pointed out the importance of developing
quantitative economic models of household saving and the important
interconnections between savings, insurance, and income risk. This chapter builds
on the discussion of the previous chapter by calibrating a model of household
saving featuring a heterogeneous income process to empirical data on the wealth
distribution and assessing the models fit under different parametrisations of
the income process. The main finding is that including profile heterogeneity
significantly worsens the models ability to fit the data moments, a finding which
is robust across all income processes estimated in the previous chapter. We
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then conduct comparative statics exercises to explore what drives this result.
These exercises show that it is precisely the main difference that separates HIP
from RIP processes – the lower estimated persistence and variance of transitory
shocks – which keeps the model from matching the shape of the empirical wealth
distribution. While lifetime inequality in an income distribution simulated from
an HIP process with modest amounts of profile heterogeneity is just as high as
that found in an income distribution simulated from a persistent AR(1) process
with high innovation variance, the different mechanism generating this inequality
crucially alters household savings behaviour.
The model employed in this chapter is a standard incomplete markets life-cycle
model of household consumption and savings as described in chapter 2, with the
addition of a learning mechanism for household income, as first used by Guvenen
(2007). While this model has recently been used to study household’s portfolio
choices (Chang et al. 2013) and the joint evolution of income and consumption
inequality in a rich dynamic model featuring informal insurance mechanisms
(Guvenen and Smith 2014), the implications of heterogeneous income processes
and learning for the aggregate wealth distribution have so far not been examined
to the best of our knowledge. Although a very early working paper version
of Guvenen (2007) briefly comments on the wealth distribution that obtains
in a model of profile heterogeneity and learning20, noting that overall wealth
accumulation is significantly higher than in a model without profile uncertainty,
to the best of our knowledge no further investigations into the ability of life-cycle
models with profile heterogeneity to match the wealth distribution have been
20At the time of writing, the working paper can be accessed at http://www.usc.edu/schools/
business/FBE/seminars/papers/M_5-18-04_GUVENEN-Labrisk04.pdf.
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undertaken. Given the recent evidence discussed in chapter 3 pointing towards
profile heterogeneity as an important feature of real life income processes, it
is important to understand what including these income processes in life-cycle
models – arguably making them reflect better the actual risk facing households
in reality – means for the wealth distribution predicted by the model. While
chapter 2 showed that there are many promising extensions to the standard model
making it conform better to the empirical wealth distribution, virtually all papers
discussed there rely on a simple AR(1) process with persistent and transitory
shocks for the modelling of income risk, a process that, if the HIP specification
estimated in chapter 3 is correct, significantly overstates both the magnitude and
the persistence of permanent shocks to household income. Therefore, this chapter
examines theoretical wealth distributions coming out of models relying on the
HIP process for household income, under the assumption that households are
imperfectly informed about the parameters of their individual income process, but
able to learn them over the course of their working life. Using the parameter
estimates from chapter 3, it explores the implications of changes over time
and across household income measures for the predicted wealth distribution.
Following Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011), it then uses a minimum distance
estimator to calibrate discount factor and risk aversion in order to minimise
the difference between wealth holdings at different percentiles of the wealth
distribution in the model and the data. Then, comparative statics exercises are
performed to isolate the role of the different parameters of the HIP process in
determining the shape of the income distribution. Finally, the sensitivity of the
model to changes in agents’ initial beliefs and the role of systematic mistakes in
beliefs is investigated.
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at+1 = (1 + r)at + yt − ct (4.2)
yit =

(θ0, X it) + f(θ




t for t < R
yR for t >= R
(4.3)
at+1 ≥ a (4.4)
where ct is consumption in period t, at are asset holdings subject to a borrowing
constraint a, and yit is individual income, which follows the heterogeneous income
specification in logs discussed in chapter 3:
yit = g(θ
0, X it) + f(θ





Here, g(θ0, X it) captures age effects and individual specific characteristics such as
experience and education21, zit is an autoregressive process of order one equivalent
to the one used in chapter 3, ε is a transitory shock following a standard normal
distribution and f(·) is an individual specific function that plays the decisive role
21In keeping with chapter three, θ0 will be modelled as a cubic polynomial in experience, with
the parameters obtained from a pooled regression on the data underlying the estimates in that
chapter.
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in introducing heterogeneity and learning in the model. Here, f(·) is defined as:















The parameters α and β are randomly distributed over the population and govern
the evolution of lifetime income over time. Furthermore, they are unknown to
individuals upon entering the labour market, meaning that in order to calculate
an expected lifetime income to base consumption choices on, consumers in the
model have to form beliefs over the values of their individual parameters. Here
again we follow Guvenen in assuming that these beliefs are formed optimally in a
Bayesian fashion, which means solving a Kalman filtering problem. Denoting by
Sit+1 the vector of parameters α
i, βi and zit+1 and by F the coefficient vector in the










where we denote by Ŝit|t the optimal estimate of the individual specific parameters
of the income process in period t after having observed the realisation of yit, and
by Ŝit+1|t the optimal forecast based on those beliefs, assuming that the transition
matrix F is known to the household. Pt|t is the variance-covariance matrix of Ŝit|t
and R is the variance of the transitory shock. A similar expression can be derived
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for the evolution of Pt+1|t:
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 − Pt|t−1Ht[H ′tPt|t−1Ht +R]−1H ′tPt|t−1 (4.7)
Pt+1|t = FPt|tF
′ +Q (4.8)
With Q denoting the covariance matrix of the innovation in the state space
representation of Ŝit+1|t (which is basically the innovation in the AR(1) component
of earnings). Given this formulation for the evolution of beliefs, we can write the













which again has to be solved subject to the constraints, 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5-4.8.
Note that given this formulation of the problem, all state variables appearing in
the continuation value function on the right- hand side of the Bellman equation
are functions of the realisation of income next period, so that the expectation in
4.9 has to be taken only with respect to ŷit+1. The distribution of next period’s
expectation of income is known exactly, conditional on current beliefs:
ŷit+1 ∼ N(α̂t|t + (t+ 1)β̂it|t + ρẑt|t, σ2α + t2σ2β + 2tσαβ + σ2η + σ2ε
An important issue when trying to match empirical wealth distributions is the
specification of the pension system. The household problem during retirement is
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straightforward to solve in the absence of uncertainty; it is given by







at+1 = (1 + r)at + ȳ − ct (4.11)
yR = M(ȳ, Ȳ ) (4.12)
at+1 ≥ a (4.13)
where M is a benefit function that emulates the US Social Security system and is
specified following much of the literature on life-cycle models (cp. Storesletten
et al. (2004), Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011), Guvenen and Smith (2014),
amongst others) as a function depending on average lifetime income of an
individual, ȳ, relative to the economy-wide average income Ȳ :
yP =

0.9ȳ ifȳ < 0.3Ȳ
0.27 + 0.32(ȳ − 0.3) ifȳ ≤ 2.0Ȳ
0.814 + 0.15(ȳ − 2.0) ifȳ ≤ 4.1Ȳ
1.129Ȳ ifȳ > 4.1Ȳ
Note that this system attenuates the inequality in lifetime income created by the
stochastic process for income by providing higher replacement rates for poor
households than for rich households. To avoid adding another state variable to
the model, we replace the true value of ȳ by an estimate derived from running the
63
LEARNING AND THE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
cross-sectional regression
ȳi = k0 + k1y
i
T
where i denotes one agent in our simulation. The coefficients (k0, k1) are then
used to predict an agent’s average lifetime income for the purposes of determining
his pension entitlement based on realised income in the final period of working
life. With an R-squared of 0.9, this regression gives a reasonable estimate of the
true lifetime income of an agent.
4.2.1 Computational Algorithm
To solve the model, we adopt a strategy similar to that in Guvenen and Smith
(2014). After drawing an income distribution and simulating agent’s learning
given a set of initial beliefs, we construct a three-point grid for α̂, a fifteen-
point grid for β̂ and a seven-point grid for ẑ, all linearly spaced ranging from
the lowest to the highest belief coming out of the simulation of agent’s learning
process. For wealth, we choose 40 grid points, exponentially spaced with a higher
concentration of points at low levels of wealth. The choice of grid size is motivated
by an iterative procedure, in which the model is repeatedly solved using finer
grids in each step until an additional grid point in a given dimension makes an
insignificant contribution to the resulting wealth distribution coming out of the
simulation. The income processes underlying the simulations are taken directly
from the estimations in 3, with the g() function chosen such that the average life-
cycle profile for income tracks that in the PSID or BHPS data. The household’s
pension problem can be solved analytically – as there is no uncertainty and the
utility function allows for an analytical expression of the Euler equation, a closed-
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form solution for consumption as a function of the pension level and retirement
wealth can be obtained –, while the household’s working life problem is solved
recursively on all grid points in the four- dimensional state space. To evaluate the
continuation value function on the right- hand side of the Bellman equation, we
employ quadrilinear interpolation combined with Gauss-Hermite quadrature on
ten nodes for the numerical integration 22. In the simulation step, we initialise
household wealth holdings by drawing from the empirical wealth distribution for
23 to 25 year old households from the Survey of Consumer Finances, data that is
available in Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011). We check the sensitivity of model
results to this choice by comparing them to the alternative of zero wealth holdings
at age 20 for all households and confirm both that there is no qualitative difference
in model results, and that the quantitative differences are negligible. All codes
used in this chapter can be found in my GitHub repository LearningModels.
It should be noted that all solutions to the model explored in this chapter proceed
on the assumption that individual income follows an AR(1) process which, while
highly persistent, does not contain a unit root. While this assumptions seems to
be justified based on the results of the preceding chapter, there is an ongoing
debate in the literature about the reliability of approaches as the one taken
above to adequately discriminate a highly persistent from a unit root process.
Gustavsson and Oesterholm (2010), in a paper adding to the evidence against a
unit root in individual income, discuss the literature and potential shortcomings of
existing tests. Assuming a unit root in individual incomes would make the process
agents are trying to forecast non-stationary and could potentially have important
22In particular, the linear interpolation was performed using the ApproXD.jl package (Oswald,
2014), while the Gauss-Hermite nodes were derived using the FastGaussQuadrature.jl package
(Townsend, 2015).
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consequences for the model solution.
4.3 Quantitative Results
To take the model to the data, we follow the strategy in Hintermaier and
Koeniger (2011) and calibrate the model using a minimum distance estimator that
minimizes the difference between wealth holdings at percentiles 10 to 90 of the
net wealth distribution for different ages. The values for the SCF can be readily
obtained from the code of Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011), while we use the UK
Wealth and Asset survey to derive similar statistics for the UK for fitting the model
when the income process is derived from BHPS data. The target moments in the
data are the wealth holdings at percentiles 10 to 90 for prime age households
(ages 26 to 55), as well as for young (ages 26 to 35), middle aged (ages 36 to
45) and old (46 to 55) households23, which gives us a total of 324 moments to
match. Stacking all of these moments into a vector µ, and denoting the vector
of percentile wealth holdings for households simulated from the model by θ, the




Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011) derive a normality result for the estimates
obtained from this estimator, which allows us to compute standard errors as the








23When using WAS data, the age categories are all shifted back by one year (that is, young
households are aged 25 to 34), as this is the categorisation used in the survey.
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As our baseline estimate, we fit the HIP process estimated from the full sample of
PSID households from 1968 to 2013 in chapter 3. From the minimum distance
estimation, we obtain a discount factor of δ = 0.973 and a risk aversion parameter
σ = 1.90 as the best fit, although the value of the objective function at the
minimum is still very high. The reason for this can be seen graphically in figure
4.1 and figure 4.2: the model entirely misses the shape of the empirical wealth
distribution, predicting too little wealth at the low end of the distribution, too
high wealth accumulation for households between the 20th and 70th percentile,
and too small wealth holdings again for households at the highest percentiles 24.
Breaking the result down by age groups, we see that young households are much
poorer in the model than they are in the data, while older cohorts display much
higher savings.
From these results it is obvious that the shape of the wealth distribution
predicted by the model is so fundamentally wrong that none of the processes
estimated in chapter 3 will stand a chance of matching the empirical wealth
distribution. In the interest of brevity, we therefore skip a graphical presentation of
the model fit for the processes estimated from BHPS data to the empirical wealth
distribution in the WAS, and only report the results of the minimum distance
estimation in table 4.1. It can be seen that all estimates of the discount factor
are significantly lower than those obtained by Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011),
an artefact of the fact that overall wealth accumulation in the life-cycle model
featuring an HIP income process is much higher than in a comparable model
relying on a simple AR(1) income specification, as reported in the earlier working
24Note that in all plots, we only display wealth holdings in model and data between the first and
90th percentile.
67
LEARNING AND THE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
Figure 4.1: Baseline model (PSID HIP income process), calibrated fit
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Figure 4.2: Baseline model (PSID HIP income process), calibrated fit by age group
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paper version of Guvenen (2007). In the first row, we also report the results
for fitting a model using the HIP parameters estimated from the PSID data, but
excluding the deterministic life cycle profile of earnings, gt(θ0, X it), which is the
exact income process used in Guvenen (2007). The results show that the estimated
discount factor is almost exactly that used in Guvenen’s paper, at 0.961, and
importantly significantly lower than all other discount factors, estimated including
the respective life-cycle profiles of earnings extracted from the different data
sets. Intuitively, this result stems from the fact that without the deterministic
income profile, the mean of households’ expected earnings distributions is much
closer to zero, creating a larger precautionary savings motive. The minimum
distance estimator then tries to counterbalance this by choosing a lower discount
factor, increasing aggregate savings by making households more patient. This
suggests that the increase in aggregate savings coming from an HIP based model
as reported in the earliest working paper version of Guvenen (2007) is somewhat
overstated when the life-cycle profile of earnings is disregarded25.
4.4 Comparative Statics
Given the largely disappointing results of the calibration and simulation exercises,
we now turn to some comparative statics exercises to elicit what features of the
model are crucial to get closer to the shape of the observed wealth distribution.
25Although it has to be noted here that, at least for our measures of gross labour incomes, the
processes we estimate might understate the true ”disaster risk” in income, given that the sample
selection process excluded households with zero earnings. Guvenen et al. (2015) make some effort
to alleviating this problem by introducing a mixture of AR(1) components into an HIP process,
with one of the AR(1) processes capturing the very low likelihood of extremely large shocks to
household income.
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Table 4.1: Calibrating the model for different income risk profiles
Income Process δ σ
PSID 1968-2013 (no lifecycle) 0.961 1.41
(0.0008) (0.006)
PSID 1968-2013 (with lifecycle) 0.973 1.90
(0.0008) (0.006)
BHPS gross labour income 0.967 0.621
(0.00027) (0.041)
BHPS net labour income 0.965 0.5
(0.00046) (0.036)
BHPS net household income 0.975 1.28
(0.0069) (0.166)
To do so, we pick a reasonable baseline calibration from the set of available
parameters estimated for different income processes in chapter 3, and then vary
each of the 8 parameters governing the model solution by solving the model
in turn for its highest and lowest realization. The parameter values used are
summarized in table 4.2. It is noted that these simulations are meant to be
illustrative only, and explore the sensitivity of the model results with respect to a
given parameter. They can not be directly mapped to any real world counterpart,
as fixing one of the parameters of the income process at a given value would
require re-estimation of the remaining parameters as described in 3 to ensure that
the new process represents as closely as possible the true underlying income risk
households are facing.
Changing the variance of the cross-sectional distribution of intercepts does not
influence the results in any meaningful ways, as could have been anticipated from
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Table 4.2: Parameters for comparative statics







Lowest realization 0.94 1.05 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00068 -1.
Baseline 0.96 2.0 0.85 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.00038 -0.3
Highest realizatoin 0.98 3.0 0.92 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.00001 0.
the fact that α in effect parallel shifts the entire life-cycle profile of households
up or down, which, given that almost all households are far enough away
from the borrowing constraint at all times, and in the absence of any different
savings behaviour of rich households in the model (as e.g. found in the data by
Dynan et al. 2004), means that savings behaviour is not affected by this change.
Similarly, changing the variance of the transitory shock does not alter the results
significantly, save for an overall increase in wealth holdings for the highest value
of σ2ε
26. The two parameters that have a markedly larger influence on the shape of
the predicted percentile distribution, and hence help the model get closer to the
data moments, are the persistence of the AR(1) component and the variance of its
innovations. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the effects of varying the persistence of the
AR(1) component of the income process for prime age households and households
by age group, respectively. When increasing ρ to 0.92, the predicted wealth
distribution becomes notably more curved, while the effect of lowering ρ from
0.85 to 0.72 is significantly smaller. This is not very surprising, as the implications
of lowering ρ for the half-life of a persistent shock become less severe the lower the
starting value of ρ – as figure 4.19 demonstrates, the half life of a persistent shock
under the baseline ρ = 0.85 is about four years, while for ρ = 0.72 it is two years
26Graphical results can be found in the Appendix
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and for ρ = 0.92 it is eight years. The model with a high value of the persistent
shock performs especially well in capturing the higher wealth accumulation at the
higher end of the distribution for the oldest groups of households, which is exactly
when we would expect the effect of a series of persistent shocks accumulating over
the life-cycle to play the biggest role. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 display the results for
changes in the variance of persistence shocks. Just as in the case of an increase in
persistence ρ, increasing the variance of the persistent shocks helps to increase
the curvature of the predicted wealth distribution, by lowering savings at the
lower and and increasing wealth holdings at the upper end at the same time.
Indeed, both changes in ρ and in σ2η bring the model parametrisation closer in
line with that of Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011), who are using ρ = 0.95 and
σ2η = 0.47 in their baseline calibration. Importantly, ρ and σ
2
η have similar effects
on the income distribution that differ from the effects of increases in σ2α and σ
2
ε ,
as evidenced in table 4.3. It appears that a crucial ingredient if the model if it
is to match the empirical wealth distribution is the inequality in lifetime income,
and, importantly, the source of this inequality. As can be seen in figures 4.7 and
4.8, changing the dispersion of individual- specific growth rates of income does
not have the same effects on the aggregate wealth distribution as changes in ρ
or σ2η. The reason for this is that rich households in a world in which lifetime
income inequality is high mostly because of the size and persistence of permanent
shocks need to save in periods of high income, as the effect of the good shock
will wear off and might be overlaid by the effects of a large negative shock in
the future, while households that are rich in a world where income inequality is
high because of inequality in deterministic growth rates will have high income
growth across their life-cycle for certain, and hence don’t need to save less to
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achieve consumption smoothing27. We then have to conclude that the very essence
of the difference between HIP and RIP models of the income process – a lower
persistence and variance of the AR(1) component of income, offset by variation
in individual-specific, deterministic income growth rates – is what keeps it from
matching the empirical profile of wealth holdings. Indeed, our model nests the
model in Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011) as a special case with σ2α and σ
2
β equal
to zero, and as figures 4.17 and 4.18 in the appendix show, the model fits the data
well with this version of the RIP process. To illustrate the vast improvement in
model fit, it is instructive to consider the value of the objective function, which
gives the sum of the squared difference between model and data moments for all
324 targeted moments: while the best fit of the HIP models implies a value of
the objective function of between 350 and 900, the RIP process specified with the
parametrisation of Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011) reaches a minimum at 7828.
The finding that it is mainly the variability of lifetime income that drives wealth
accumulation in the model echoes the work of Floden (2008), who shows that the
Aiyagari (1994) result of an increase in aggregate wealth holdings in incomplete
markets economies with idiosyncratic income variations obtains even when all
uncertainty about future income is removed, so that saving is purely driven by the
consumption smoothing motive.
27In fact, to the extent that households know about their high income growth rate early in life,
they will save less than poor households, who are potentially facing negative income growth rates.
28Our results are not exactly the same as those derived in Hintermaier and Koeniger (2011), as
we employ a different solution technique, which implies a less accurate solution to the model, and
our model lacks some features present in their paper, notably a rigorous treatment of the US tax
system and uncertain lifespans after retirement.
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Lowest realisation -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 -0.29 -0.22
Highest realisation 0.31 0.35 0.09 0.11 0.41 0.05
Figure 4.3: Comparative statics for persistence of AR(1) component, prime age
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Figure 4.4: Comparative statics for persistence of AR(1) component, by age groups
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Figure 4.5: Comparative statics for innovation variance of persistent shock, prime
age
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Figure 4.6: Comparative statics for innovation variance of persistent shock, by age
groups
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Figure 4.7: Comparative statics for variance of individual-specific growth rates,
prime age
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Figure 4.8: Comparative statics for variance of individual-specific growth rates, by
age groups
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4.5 The role of initial beliefs
One question when working with beliefs is obviously how initial beliefs are
derived. While the model so far had agents starting with random beliefs centred
around their individual-specific true parameter, and we have discussed the role of
uncertainty induced by learning, we will now briefly consider situations in which
the initial beliefs are systematically incorrect. Of course, with an appropriately
chosen set of initial beliefs, the model can be made to produce almost any desired
result, so that we will only consider two situations which are at least supported by
anecdotal evidence. The first very simple experiment is done under the assumption
that agents suffer from overconfidence regarding their own economic fortune.
There are a host of studies that offer support for the view that people are too
optimistic about their future earnings potential, e.g. a Gallup poll by Moore
(2003) in which half of all respondents aged 18 to 29 state that they regard it
very or at least somewhat likely to be rich in the future, with the median figure for
expected yearly income and wealth cited at $120,000 and $1 million, respectively.
Of course it is questionable whether actual economic choices would be based on
a vague belief about the indefinite future29, we can use our model to assess what
would happen if people would indeed act on them. Figure 4.9 shows the wealth
distribution that obtains if all agents start with a belief that is one percentage point
above their original initial belief. The results are not as striking as one might have
expected, with the entire wealth distribution apart from the lowest percentile,
which is constrained in any case, being shifted down, albeit not by much.
The second scenario under consideration is related to the shifts in the US
29Another constraint on this is that these beliefs would require large amounts of borrowing in
the present, for which optimistic people would have to find lenders who share their beliefs.
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income distribution happening throughout the 80s and 90s. As has been well
documented, wage inequality experienced a secular rise during this period, with
top incomes surging, while incomes at the bottom of the distribution saw their
growth rates fall. To the extent that these changes were unobserved by agents
contemporaneously, and happened through changes in the idiosyncratic growth
rates, they might have biased beliefs of agents entering the labour market, if
they form their beliefs based on past observations of income growth for people
in similar places in the wealth distribution. To capture a stylised version of
this process in the model we will solve the model assuming that those agents
in the upper quintile of the true distribution of β start life with a belief one
percentage point below their original initial belief, those in percentiles 60 to 80
half a percentage point lower, those in percentiles 20 to 40 half a percentage
point higher, and those in the bottom quintile one percentage point higher. The
results in figure 4.10 show a tilting of the wealth distribution, with agents at the
upper end accumulating more wealth, since they ascribe a larger part of their good
fortune to permanent shocks given that they systematically underestimate their
deterministic growth rate. At the same time, more agents at the lower end of the
distribution are constrained, as they expect higher future income growth than will
actually materialise. These changes in the wealth distribution are consistent with
the observed increase in wealth inequality that followed the increase in income
inequality in the 1980s and 90s (as discussed in Iacoviello (2008)) and could
form the basis of a demand-driven expansion of household debt at the lower
end of the income distribution. Indeed, rising income inequality is often cited
as a prime reason for the increase in household indebtedness (see e.g. Rajan
(2011), Saez and Zucman (2014), or, for a more heterodox treatment, Barba
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Figure 4.9: Effects of optimistic initial beliefs
and Pivetti (2009)), although from the standpoint of a standard life-cycle model
of consumption and savings this link should be absent, given that recent work
based on Social Security records shows virtually the entire increase in income
inequality to be due to permanent, rather than transitory shocks, which should
result in changes in consumption, rather than wealth inequality. One possibility
for permanent changes in the income distribution not to immediately filter through
to the consumption distribution could then, according to our model, be hysteresis
in belief formation of agents entering the labour market at different points of the
income distribution.
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Figure 4.10: Effects of beliefs based on previous income growth rates
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Figure 4.11: Effects of subjective belief about probability of zero income
realisation
4.6 Incorporating disaster risk
Figure 4.11 shows the effect of including the subjective possibility of a zero income
realisation on savings profiles. It is noted that the actual underlying income
process is not altered, so that while agents expect a zero income realisation with
probability ξ in each period, it actually never materialises, so that the income
histories in this model economy are exactly the same as in our previous examples.
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4.7 Bequest motives
Figure 4.12 shows the effect of including a bequest motive, modelled as in e.g.
Kopczuk and Lupton (2007). In this model economy, the working life problem
is equivalent to that outlined in equation 4.9, while the retirement problem is
adapted to include a positive probability of dying in each period (taking from






δt(1− ζ)u(ct) + ζκat (4.14)
subject to the same constraints as in equation 4.10. Here, ζ is the age-varying
probability of dying before next period, while κ is a constant scaling parameter
measuring the importance of bequests relative to personal consumption. This
specification implies that bequests are a luxury good, as the marginal utility of
leaving a bequest increases in the level of wealth holdings. This assumption
is standard in the literature on bequests. Figure 4.12 shows that incorporating
a bequest motive dramatically improves the fit of the model, as it allows for a
significant increase in wealth accumulation at the top of the wealth distribution.
Due to numerical instabilities it has unfortunately not been possible to jointly
estimate the (β, σ, κ) combination
4.8 Discussion
As this chapter has shown, the learning model of heterogeneous income processes
fails in capturing the dynamics of the wealth distribution under all calibrations
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Figure 4.12: Effects of bequest motive
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derived from empirical data on income processes. Comparing the model output of
different counterfactual parametrisations, it became clear that the main reason
behind this is not the learning mechanism itself, but the different income
distribution and risk implied by the heterogeneous income process. To salvage the
model, ad-hoc changes to the belief structure of agents can be made, although
at this point it becomes a bit of a free-for-all and the model can be made to
predict any pattern in the data with a suitable choice of initial beliefs. Building
on the work in this chapter, future research should consider the implications
of other more realistic income processes on the wealth distribution, to the
extent that they can be formulated parsimoniously enough not to increase the
computational burden beyond reason. An example would be the work by Meghir
and Pistaferri (2004), who model the conditional variance of income shocks using
an ARCH model and show analytically that the addition of individual- specific
heterogeneity in the innovation variance leads to both a larger dispersion of
savings rates and higher aggregate saving. A further case of interest would be
the specification derived by Guvenen et al. (2015), which adapts the income
process used in this chapter by adding two more AR(1) components with different
innovation variances, so that households are subject to potential shocks of
different magnitude. As the evidence points to this process being the best
description of the income risk households are facing in reality, the implications
of this process for the wealth distribution should be investigated further.
4.9 Appendix A: Comparative statics results
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Figure 4.13: Comparative statics for variance of individual-specific intercepts,
prime age
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Figure 4.14: Comparative statics for variance of individual-specific intercepts, by
age group
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Figure 4.15: Comparative statics for variance of transitory shocks, prime age
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Figure 4.16: Comparative statics for variance of transitory shocks, by age group
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Figure 4.17: Model fit when income is an RIP process with ρ = 0.95 and σ2η = 0.5
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Data
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Figure 4.18: Model fit when income is an RIP process with ρ = 0.95 and σ2η = 0.5,
by age groups
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Figure 4.19: Effects of lowering ρ on half life of persistent shocks


















The Competitive Effects of Trade
Liberalisation in North America: An
Empirical Application of the Melitz
and Ottaviano Model
5.1 Introduction
The economic benefits of free trade are arguably one of the most uncontroversial
results of economic research, both theoretically and empirically. However, to
this date, free trade is by no means uncontroversial in the public sphere, as
is evidenced by the fierce opposition that the proposed transatlantic free trade
agreement between the US and Europe is facing. Hence, international trade
has remained an active field in economic research, a field which has seen major
advancements in the past two decades in incorporating firm-level heterogeneity
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coupled with consumer love of variety into trade models that can account for
the firm-level responses to increasing trade openness and the large share of
intra-industry trade in the international flow of goods and services30. This new
vintage of trade models predicts additional welfare gains from trade stemming
from reallocations of production to more productive firms (as in Melitz, 2003) or
increases in firms’ efforts to innovate (as in Grossman and Helpman, 1990). To
some extent, these new models of trade also help reconcile the unambiguously
positive stance of economic researchers on trade liberalization with the public
opposition to it – models taking into account explicitly the heterogeneity across
agents of firms within a country show that while on aggregate there are significant
efficiency gains from free trade, there are also firms and workers who will lose out
individually, and can only benefit from a trade liberalization if either the aggregate
gains are redistributed in some way to ensure a Pareto improving allocation,
or if they can benefit from the reallocation of production to more productive
firms by switching to those firms. DixCarneiro (2014) builds a structural model
of the Brazilian labour market to estimate the labour market effects of trade
liberalization and finds that, depending on the assumptions about capital mobility,
the reallocation of workers across sectors can take up to 30 years.
While these new models of international trade are well grounded in empirical
evidence coming from micro data, there are surprisingly few tests of the model
predictions for aggregate variables which are decisive for the predicted welfare
gains from trade. Recently, Arkolakis et al. (2012a,b) call into question the
importance of firm-level heterogeneity by showing that in a wide class of trade
30A comprehensive survey of trade models with love of variety preferences and firm-level
heterogeneity can be found in Melitz and Trefler (2012).
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models including the Melitz (2003) model, the additional welfare gains are
relatively small, and are diminished further if the assumption of CES utility for
consumers is abandoned. The response of Melitz and Redding (2013) shows that
there is still considerable disagreement over how to theoretically evaluate the
additional welfare gains from firm selection, and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare
(2014) review the effects of trade liberalizations in a wider class of new trade
models to highlight the importance of the market structure under consideration
– depending on whether a one- or multi-sector model is used and the degree of
competition assumed, gains from trade are estimated to range from 4% to 40%
of non-free-trade welfare. These facts motivate us to test the Melitz-Ottaviano
model directly in aggregate data on prices, markups and productivity. To do so,
we estimate the effects of trade liberalization on the competitive environment
in manufacturing markets of the member countries of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). We employ an estimation procedure based on the
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model introduced by Chen et al. (2009), which
to our knowledge is the only empirical application of a model with firm-level
heterogeneity on aggregate data. Chen et al. (2009) derive estimable regression
equations from the model’s equilibrium conditions that allow us to test the effects
of trade openness on relative price levels, markups and labour productivities of
two trading partners. It is further possible to differentiate between the effects
of trade in the short run, which, in the model, refers to an economy without
relocation decisions for firms, and in the long run, when firms are free to choose
their home market for production. However, as the underlying model is static, no
direct results on the time path of the impact of trade liberalization can be obtained.
We try to address this issue by dividing our sample in ways that make it more
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amenable to a model-based estimation. Contrary to Chen et al. (2009), we directly
observe tariff rates between the three countries in our sample and hence use those
as a direct measure of trade openness. Additionally, we test for the effects of
third-country trade openness on the relative performance of two countries that
are linked through trade, predictions for which can be derived from the multi-
country version of the Melitz and Ottaviano model. Our dataset comprises of 64
manufacturing sectors in Canada, Mexico and the US, covering the time period
from the introduction of the US-Canadian free trade agreement CUSFTA in 1988
up to 2010, which gives us reason to believe that we are able to capture the long
run effects of policy changes even in industries with low firm churning rates.
Our findings support the main model predictions, with tariff barriers stifling
domestic competition, leading to higher producer prices and markups as well
as lower productivity. In the immediate years after the free-trade agreement
when tariff barriers are reduced, relative prices and markups decrease as relative
productivity increases, thus giving rise to competitive effects. The results in the
long-run, however, are not as clear cut, with some effects reversing as predicted
by the model while some effects persist. This is also confirmed by directly looking
at the reaction of industries with different entry barriers to changes in trade
openness.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 gives a survey of the previous
literature assessing the effects of trade liberalizations in general and of NAFTA
specifically. Section 5.3 briefly summarizes the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
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model, derives the most important equilibrium conditions and explains the
estimation strategy used in Chen et al. (2009). Section 5.4 then presents our
application of the model by giving an overview of the data used and our estimation
procedure. The results of our regressions and possible shortcomings as well as




As free trade has been an active topic in economic research since the times of
Ricardo, the literature on the welfare gains from trade is immense. Of particular
interest to us are papers that investigate the economic effects of NAFTA directly,
as well as papers that form the theoretical foundation for our estimation strategy.
The effects of free trade in North America have been scrutinised in a large
number of papers over the past two decades, starting with work on the predecessor
to NAFTA, the 1987 Canada and US free trade agreement (CUSFTA). Head and
Ries (1999) document rationalization effects in Canadian plants as a reaction to
decreases in Canadian import duties. Trefler (2004), focusing on the CUSFTA,
uses a reduced form econometric approach to find large improvements in labour
productivity and decreases in employment after the implementation of CUSFTA,
coupled with slightly lower import prices and larger volumes of trade. Fukao,
Okubo and Stern (2003) derive regression equations from a partial equilibrium
model with imperfect competition to estimate the extent to which NAFTA was
trade diverting rather than creating and find responses that vary by industry.
Romalis (2007) examines both CUSFTA and NAFTA with a strategy based on
estimating demand and supply elasticities and finds a large effect of NAFTA on
trade volumes, with only minor price changes and, subsequently, only small
changes in welfare. Calderon-Madrid and Voicu (2007) use plant-level panel
data from Mexico to show that while productivity increases followed the tariff
reductions, the responses of plant-level productivity are very unevenly distributed,
with larger plants benefiting disproportionately from productivity increases. The
Melitz (2003) model that is at the heart of our analysis is also put to a test with
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US manufacturing data by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006a), who use plant-
level data to estimate the effects of changes in the costs of trade, as measured by
tariff rates and transportation cost, on productivity growth and firm entry and exit.
Their findings confirm the micro-level implications derived from the assumptions
on the productivity distribution in Melitz (2003), which we will highlight in
the following section. Other papers have used the structure provided by the
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model to assess the effects of trade liberalization
in other parts of the world: Bellone et al. (2008) use price-cost margins of French
manufacturing firms to test the models predictions on the effects of market size,
import penetration and exporting status on markups and productivity and confirm
that all predictions hold. Corcos et al. (2011) estimate structural parameters in
order to simulate counterfactual scenarios by changing the costs of trade between
countries. Their exercise shows that the firm selection mechanism is crucial for the
magnitude of the welfare gains from trade and the potential gains for a country
depend on country size as well as remoteness. The paper that is closest to our
own work is Chen et al. (2009), who use the equilibrium expressions for prices,
markups and productivity from the Melitz-Ottaviano model to estimate the effects
of trade liberalization using a dataset that includes data on 10 manufacturing
sectors in seven European countries for the period 1989-1999 with country-pair
regressions. There results suggest that trade openness leads to an increase in
competitiveness in the short-run with diminishing and at times reversed effects in
the long-run, as predicted by the model.
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5.3 Model and Estimation Equations
The Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model is a synthesis of the contributions of
Melitz (2003), who introduces firm heterogeneity through random draws of a cost
parameter for firms entering the market, and Ottaviano et al. (2002), who develop
a model with endogenous markups arising from a linear consumer demand system
with horizontal product differentiation. The model yields equilibrium conditions
that determine a cost cut-off level, i.e. a level of productivity below which firms
are not able to compete in the marketplace. This cut-off level uniquely determines
all relevant aggregate variables in the model, namely the distribution of prices,
markups and productivity. Importantly, the equilibrium conditions of the model
economy are different depending on whether firm entry is allowed or not. Without
firm entry, the model captures a short-run equilibrium, with the cost cutoffs in
two markets given by (as shown in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), following the



























Here, a star denotes the foreign market, N̄ is the fixed number of incumbents in a
market and N is the number of firms that are producing. cM is the upper bound of
the distribution of cost draws, cD is the cut-off level, i.e. the highest cost draw that
allows a firm to earn non-negative profits. τ > 1 is the iceberg cost of trade faced
by foreign companies exporting to the domestic market and can be interpreted as
a measure of trade costs, tariffs and other impediments to trade. k is the shape
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parameter of the cost distribution, assumed to be Pareto.
The long-run equilibrium of the economy allows for firm entry into a market, so
that the number of firms in a market is now endogenously determined by a zero
profit condition for entrants that balances a fixed cost of entry with the expected
profits when drawing a cost level from the (known) cost distribution of a country.
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that the equilibrium conditions pinning down



















where L is the size of the domestic market and φ = 2γ(k + 1)(k + 2). Since
all aggregate variables in the Melitz and Ottaviano model are linear functions of
the cost cut-off, equations describing the relative price, markup and productivity
levels in two countries connected by trade can easily be found by simply dividing






































































These two equations capture one of the central predictions of the Melitz and
Ottaviano model: asymmetrical trade liberalizations will have opposing effects
on competitiveness in the short and the long run. By equation (5.5), lowering
trade barriers induces a fall in the cost cutoff, and hence decreases in prices and
markups and increases in productivity. In the long run, however, the effects are
reversed, as an increase in trade costs induces firms to choose the relatively more
protected market for production, thereby increasing competition in markets that
are shielded from foreign firms.
Chen et al. (2009) show that it is possible to substitute out the trade cost term with
an openness term that is derived from a measure of foreign firms market share in
the domestic market. However, since we are interested in the effect of tariff rates
on competitiveness, we use tariff data directly as a proxy for τ . This strategy
should pick up the effects of tariff rates in our estimation if other determinants
of trade openness (e.g. oil prices (Kilian et al., 2009), credit conditions (Chor
and Manova, 2012), shared culture and language between countries) do not vary
systematically across industries.
Similarly, an expression for the average markup can be derived. The determination
of the average markup is equivalent to the one for average prices so expressions for
the short– and long–run impacts of openness on markups can readily be derived.
Somewhat more problematic is the index for productivity, as the model requires
knowledge of a firm’s unit costs c, which are not observable. Chen et al. work
around this issue by assuming away differences in capital costs, so that average
industry productivity can be approximated by the ratio of nominal wages to labour
productivity: c̄ = w
z
. If it is additionally assumed that unit labour costs only
depend on nominal wages, the ratio of domestic to foreign labour productivity
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If the least competitive firm in an industry with a productivity draw at the upper
bound of the distribution cM has labour productivity zM and labour is perfectly






. This relationship can
then be used in an analogous fashion as before to construct an expression relating




























Higher values of θ thus lead to higher productivity (conditional on N̄/N), as they
force lower productivity firms to shut down production. For the long run, equation
























Larger markets exhibit higher labour productivity, while the effects of θ and θ∗ are
the opposite of those in the short–run.
5.3.1 The Role of Market Entry
Following the arguments in Trefler (2004), we want to exploit the nature of NAFTA
being close to a natural experiment and hence try to identify the effect of the
policy measures (i.e. the changes in tariff rates) separately from the effects of
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trade openness in general. There is evidence that trade openness – measured by
the import penetration of a certain country or industry, as in Chen et al. (2009)
– is affected by a number of external forces, including oil prices (Kilian et al.,
2009), credit conditions (Chor and Manova, 2012), shared culture and language
between countries and many more. Prior work of Bernard et al. (2006b) suggests
that U.S. tariff rates throughout the 1980s, at an average level between four and
five percent, accounted for about the same fraction of trade costs as costs directly
attached to shipping the good, i.e. freight and insurance, so we expect them to
have a similar impact on trade flows between countries and hence the competitive
environment.
As we have seen in the exposition of the Melitz and Ottaviano model above,
there is one crucial caveat in taking the model to the data: due to the static
nature of the model, the comparative static results just compare one steady state
with another, while being silent about the transitional dynamics. The estimation
strategy of Chen et al. (2009) tries to account for this by estimating an error
correction model to identify the long-run separately from the short-run, but their
results are mixed for the long run and it cannot be ruled out that this is due to
the estimation procedure. Therefore, we try to address this issue in a more direct
way: as short- and long-run in the model differ only in the possibility of firm
entry, we separate industries into those with low firm-churn rate and those with
low entry barriers. This distinction then gives us industries that represent the
short- and long-run and we can directly investigate whether the coefficients on
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the relevant variables differ significantly31. This approach, however, leads to two
issues that need to be addressed before implementation. First, it is not a priori
obvious how to measure the entry conditions in an industry; while the theoretical
model uses the number of firms, this could in practice either refer to firms or to
establishments (i.e. different production sites run by the same parent company),
or even to employees, as firms in the model use unit labour input. Second, there
is no reason to believe that different measures of entry and exit dynamics are
exogenous with respect to trade openness – indeed in the model trade openness
is a key factor in the entry decision of firms, but in the real world there might be
various other factors that might lead to industries being asymmetrically affected by
a change in trade costs, hence biasing our results. To tackle both these issues, we
aim to construct a robust measure of industry dynamics by aggregating multiple
studies that examine firm and employment turnover in Canada, Mexico and the
United States as well as Europe over different time periods. With this, we hope to
identify those industries that are either very dynamic or very static over a broad
set of different measures, regions and time periods. Table 5.1 gives an overview
of the studies used and a glance at their respective results, showing considerable
variation in the dynamics of entry and job creation in different manufacturing
sectors.
In order to aggregate the different studies, we compute percentile-based
rankings of the industries for each study (to account for the different number
of industries across studies) and then average the percentiles across studies.
31We were inspired to do so by Head and Ries (1999) who use the classification to test competing
theories of trade that rely on different market structures.
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Table 5.1: Market Structure measures used, numbers in percent











































































Based on these average percentiles, we can then split the sample according to
the short- and long-run distinction made in the model: those industries above
the 70th percentile are taken to represent the dynamic, ”free entry” sample and
thus the long run, while those industries below the 40th percentile are taken
to represent the short run. This procedure leads us to split the sample three-
ways: Tobacco, Food Processing, Paper, Chemicals, Primary Metals and Petroleum
industries are classified into the long run category, while Furniture, Wood, Non-
electrical Machineries, Fabricated Metals, Printing, Apparel, and Instruments are
taken to represent the short run of the model. The remaining industries are too
close to the median to be classified either way and are thus dropped from the
sample, which leaves us with 1863 year-industry-country pair observations for the
free entry sample, and 1701 observations for the fixed entry sample32.
A little thought experiment may clarify the role that market entry effects play
in muddling the distinction between short– and long–run equilibria. The Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008) model yields opposing predictions on the effects of trade
liberalization on country-level economic variables such as prices, productivity and
mark-ups. The reason for the differences, as we have seen, lies in the assumptions
on market structure: there are two different equilibria depending on whether



























32Due to different classification systems, the aggregation of studies was not always exact and
some industry groups are quite heterogeneous when sub-industries are considered. For further
details on the aggregation see Appendix B
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In model terms, only one of these two equations holds at any given time, and it is
posited that the first equation captures the short run effects of trade liberalization,
while in the long run firms are allowed to enter the markets and the effects of trade
barriers are determined by the second equation. No further assumptions on the
nature of the firm’s entry decisions or capital adjustment costs are made that could
help separate short- from long run. However, in reality, it seems to be more natural
to assume that there is a gradual evolution from one equilibrium to the other, and
this view is borne out by data on firm entry and exits in the studies reviewed
above, showing that in a given year, only between five and ten percent of firms in
a given industry are new entrants, while over longer horizons this figure goes up
to 80 percent. Hence, it seems to be reasonable to model the transition from the
short- to the long run equilibrium by introducing a parameter α that governs the
fraction of firms entering an industry. The effects of this parameter are most clear
on the productivity side, given that firms cannot – by assumption – change their
productivity level, the new productivity distribution will be a weighted average
of new entrants’ and existing firms’ productivity. As the examples in Chen et al.
are formulated with respect to relative prices, and we are using their notation,
we will discuss the effects of limited firm entry in the price level case as well.
The argument carries through if one is ready to assume a nominal rigidity that
prevents incumbents from re-optimizing their prices, similar to the assumptions
made in New Keynesian monetary models. Similar to the productivity level, the
price level is then a weighted average of new and old prices (for simplicity, here




p̄ = αp̄LR + (1− α)p̄SR


























where the second line drops the constant linking price level and cost cut-off for
notational simplicity. It can easily be seen that the introduction of the α parameter
makes the expression for the price level hugely complicated and eliminates the
possibility to cancel out most constant terms by using relative prices as was done
in Chen et al. (2009). Obviously, the above expression is impossible to take to the
data in the hope of identifying any of the parameters.
Let’s consider a simplified version of the above. Assume that relative prices levels

























This is a simplified version of the equilibrium conditions in Chen et al. using the
notation of Melitz and Ottaviano in which trade freeness is measured by ρ ∈ (0, 1).
It captures the main essence of the model, in the short run relative prices depend
on the number of firms and negatively on trade freeness (increasing ρwill decrease
p̄), while in the long country size matters and prices depend positively on trade
freeness (increasing ρ decreases 1− ρ and thus increases p̄). Now assume further,
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that price setting decisions and substitution behaviour of consumer is such that we






























Here, the fundamental identification problem becomes apparent: in the first term
on the right hand side of the equation, the effect of 1
τk
on p̄ is positive, while in
the second term it is negative. However, the size and sign of the composite effect
will be governed by α, which is unobservable. In order to estimate the effects of
trade openness on prices, we have to control for firms entry behaviour. While this
might well be endogenous to changes in trade policy, it is reasonable to assume
that different industries have different entry conditions due to fixed costs inherent
in the business model. We can try to exploit this variation in entry conditions by
sorting businesses according to the ease of entry; then, ceteris paribus, an industry
with lower barriers to entry should exhibit a response to trade liberalization along
the lines that the model predicts for the long run equilibrium (as the value of α
increases, p̄ approaches p̄LR), while an industry with high entry barriers subject to
the same trade liberalization should see a very different reaction.
One way to alleviate this problem is by trying to use information on α in the
estimation. Splitting the sample based on our aggregated turnover measures can
be seen as a crude approximation to this, as can be the construction of dummy
variables for high and low turnover industries. The most direct way, however,
would be to use information on industry turnover rates directly. Obviously, this
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brings back the very same endogeneity problems we described above that were
one reason to aggregate the studies in the first place, which makes it important to
instrument for entry and exit rates in industries using turnover measurements
for different periods than the one considered in the estimation. The variable
construction will be explained in more detail in the next section.
5.4 Application
Starting from the equations for prices, productivity and markups derived within
the Melitz-Ottaviano framework, we can derive estimable log-linearised equations






=β0 + β1∆ ln τit + β2∆ ln τ
∗










+ δ0 + δ1 lnLt−1 + δ2 lnL
∗






In the above equation, which is a log-linear combination of equations 5.5 and
5.6, the number of firms serving the domestic market, N , has been replaced by
the more readily observable number of domestic firms producing for the domestic





. The short–run dynamics are estimated in the first
part of the equation, with regressors expressed in first differences. The long run is
represented by the term in brackets. From the perspective of this model, we would
expect β1 > 0, an increase in domestic import tariffs increases relative prices in
the short-run, and correspondingly β2 > 0. The model predicts a dampening effect
of the number of domestic firms on domestic prices, which should be reflected by
114
TRADE AND PRODUCTIVITY
β3 < 0, and the opposite for foreign firms, β4 < 0. The equation is essentially
the same used by Chen et al. (2009), albeit with the openness share replaced by
the tariff level, which under the assumption that tariff changes are exogenous to
relative price changes, means that there is no need to instrument for our main
explanatory variable.
As previously discussed, all aggregate variables (prices, markups, productivity)
are ultimately functions of the cost-cutoff level cD, leading to a very similar
estimation equations for our other dependent variable. The effect of tariffs,
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∗
t−1 + δ3τi,t−1 + δ4τ
∗
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where δ7 and δ8 capture the effects of changes in nominal wages in the long
run. The intercepts β0 are introduced to capture differences in country–specific
technology as Chen et al. depart from the baseline Melitz-Ottaviano model by
allowing for such differences. While in the baseline, these vary by country-pair,




5.4.1 Preferential Trade Liberalization
The model results and estimation equations presented so far all referred to a
unilateral trade liberalization in a simplified two-country setup33. While making
the exposition clearer and helping to elicit the effects at work in the model, this
setup is clearly not an accurate description of the reality of trade relationships
in modern industrialized economies. Taking the United States as an example,
while the two other countries in our data set, Canada and Mexico, are its largest
trading partners, they only account for 16.6 and 13.5% of all US trade by value,
respectively34. Even the largest 30 US trading partners only account for about
86% of US trade, highlighting the fragmented nature of international trade. While
the Melitz-Ottaviano model can be extended to an arbitrary number of countries,
it is clearly not feasible to assemble a data set on all trade partners of the NAFTA
countries. We do however want to recognize the multi-country structure of NAFTA
by taking into account third country effects of trade barriers. Here, NAFTA can be
interpreted as a preferential liberalization of Mexico vis-a-vis the US and Canada,
as Mexico had the highest tariff barriers to start off with. In the three country
case, we expect the country with the lowest sum of bilateral trade barriers to have
the lowest cost cutoff, as it becomes the best export hub. To account for this, we
amend equations 5.10, and 5.11 by including the relevant third country tariffs.
The estimation equation for the effects of trade barriers on prices then becomes:
33Note that a bilateral trade liberalization – changing τ and τ∗ by the same amount – would not
lead to the discussed short- and long run changes in cost cutoffs for two countries, but instead to
a decline in the cost cutoffs in both countries both in the short and the long run.
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where now h is the domestic economy, f is the foreign economy, and, with a
slight abuse of notation, a t superscript denotes the third country for each country
pair (e.g. when estimating the Canada-US relationship, τ th are Mexican tariffs on
Canadian goods, while τht are Canadian tariffs on Mexican goods). The equation
for productivity will be amended accordingly.
5.4.2 Dataset
s Our database covers the period 1990-2007 for the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) member countries – Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. – and 64
(4-digit) manufacturing sectors. The main explanatory variable in this analysis
is the tariff imposed on foreign products. All tariff data is downloaded from the
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), an online software package published
by the World Bank in collaboration with UNCTAD, the WTO, International Trade
Center, and the UN Statistical Division. WITS publishes annual trade and tariff
data from two different sources: the World Bank IDB database and the UNCTAD
TRAINS database. Unfortunately, neither database provides a complete time series
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for each country that is devoid of erratic (and unexplained) jumps in the data.
Thus, we created a data set that uses mostly TRAINS preferential tariff (PRF)
data, but supplements it with observations from TRAINS or WTO IDB applied
tariffs (AHS) where appropriate (this choice will only make a difference where
there is no trade observed between countries and hence no applied rate, but a
preferential rate still exists). All tariff data is reported according to ISIC Rev. 3.1
and converted to NAICS. This leads to the following rules for each country: (1)
Canada: TRAINS PRF from 1989 to 1995, WTO AHS from 1996 to 2014. (2)
Mexico: TRAINS AHS from 1989 to 1994, TRAINS PRF from 1995 to 2009. (3)
USA: TRAINS PRF from 1980 to 1996; WTO AHS for 1997 to 2014.
For our factory gate price data, we use the producer price index (PPI) as
reported by CANSIM, the Banco de Mexico, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
respectively. All indices are normalized to equal 100 in 2003.
Labor productivity is calculated as the ratio between real value-added and
total employment, as provided by the OECD SDBS database for Canada, the
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI) for Mexico, and the NBER-
CES Manufacturing Industry Database for the U.S. (Becker, Gray, and Marvakov,
2013). All value-added data is converted into constant 2005 USD. The number
of establishments in each sector is taken from the OECD and and INEGI for
Canada and Mexico, respectively, and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for
the U.S. Market size is measured by the value of GDP for each country, which
is available in constant 2005 USD from the the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. And finally, our wage data comes from the OECD SDBS database for
Canada, the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia for Mexico, and the NBER-
CES Manufacturing Industry Database for the U.S. (Becker, Gray, and Marvakov,
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2013). The Canadian and Mexican data are converted to NAICS using appropriate
correspondence tables, and all values are converted to constant 2005 USD.
As discussed in the previous section, for all of the log-linearised equations, we
replace the number of firms serving the domestic market, N , with the number of
domestic firms producing for the domestic market, D. Unfortunately, this data
is not available for all three countries during the specified time period, and thus
we utilize the number of establishments, which will always be higher than the
firm count as each firm may have multiple establishments. As long as the average
number of establishments per firm remains constant, this should not present a
problem, as our model is estimated in first differences. It is however not obvious
that this relationship will remain constant in response to a trade liberalization.
In fact, the main channel through which welfare gains arise in the model is the
reallocation of production from unproductive to more productive firms, with less
productive firms exiting the market and more productive firms expanding. If
this displacement happens through larger firms taking over establishments of less
productive ones, we would expect the number of establishments to stay constant,
while the number of domestic producers falls (i.e. the number of establishments
per firm increases). If on the other hand larger firms are simply able to expand
production in existing establishments, this effect would be absent.
5.4.3 Estimation
As outlined at the beginning of Section 5.4, we follow the estimation strategy of
Chen et al. (2009); however, while they use changes in domestic and foreign
import penetration in sector i at time t as the main explanatory variables for
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changes in prices, and labour productivity, we use this as a control variable and
instead rely on the domestic tariff rate (τit) imposed on foreign goods imported
from the trading partner and the foreign tariff rate (τ ∗it) imposed on domestic
goods exported to the trading partner as the main explanatory variables. To test
the competitive effects of trade liberalization, we use the difference in differences
approach with fixed–effects on the country–pair, industry, and year. In the short
run we use the log first-difference in the explanatory and dependent variables,
whereas we use a lag operator on the explanatory variables and an error correction
term to estimate the dynamics in the long run.
Table 5.2 outlines the comparative statics for the theoretical model, with
subscript sr denoting the ”short run” and lr denoting the ”long run”. Notice
that in the long run theory suggests that the pro–competitive effects are reversed
and actually take an anti–competitive nature as firms are able to relocate to new
markets. Interestingly, as we will exhibit in the following section, our analysis
does not provide the same long-run dynamics.
Table 5.2: Comparative Statics – Model Predictions
Regressor Dependent Variables
p̄sr p̄lr µsr µlr zsr zlr
τ + – + – – +
τ∗ – + – + + –
D – – +
D∗ + + –
L – – +
L∗ + + –
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5.5 Results & Discussion
Tables 5.6, and 5.8 present our results on the short-run effects of trade
liberalization on prices and productivity, respectively. Column (1) in each table
presents the results from our theoretical estimations in equations 5.10 and 5.11,
respectively35, with fixed effects at the country-industry pair. Column (2) shows
the same regression employing fixed effects on the country-pair level, while
columns (3) and (4) give results for the sub sample of free entry and fixed entry
firms, respectively, with each regression again estimated using fixed effects at the
country-industry level. Columns (5) and (6) show the regression results for the
same regressions as in columns (3) and (4), albeit with fixed effects at the country-
pair level.
The table shows that the effects of tariff barriers on outcomes is very imprecisely
measured. While the signs on the coefficients point overwhelmingly in the
direction implied by theory – higher domestic tariffs increase domestic prices in the
short run, while higher foreign tariffs lower them –, only two model specifications
show significant coefficients. Furthermore, the coefficient on the effect of domestic
tariffs is more precisely estimated than that of foreign tariffs, a pattern that repeats
itself when looking at the estimated coefficients on our measure of firms. Here,
the foreign number of firms is generally estimated more precisely, and again all
signs on the coefficients confirm the theoretical predictions. Table 5.8 repeats the




analysis with relative productivity as the dependent variable. Here the results
are more precisely estimated and more consistent across specifications; a higher
domestic tariff lowers domestic productivity, while a higher number of domestic
firms serves to increase it. Again, there is a marked difference in the precision of
estimates for foreign and domestic variables, which can most likely be explained
by the structure of our data set. Given that we are employing three country pairs
in the estimation, not all countries contribute equally to domestic and foreign
variables. Specifically, the ordering of our data set implies that Canada serves as
the domestic market for two thirds of the data set (country pairs Canada-Mexico,
Canada-USA), while the USA are the foreign market for two thirds of the data set.
As our data set is assembled from a variety of sources, there are different patterns
of missing data, and possibly different degrees of measurement error in the data
from different countries. Hence, different independent variables might be affected
differently by problems with the data for a specific country.
Tables 5.7 and 5.9 show the results for the inclusion of third country variables.
This specification again lowers the precision of estimated effects of domestic and
foreign tariffs, rendering all coefficients insignificant. There is some evidence of
the effect of third country tariffs on relative prices in two countries, with domestic
tariffs on third country products increasing the domestic inflation rate, while third
country tariffs on foreign country imports lower the relative growth rate of the
domestic price level. This provides some support for the mechanism put forward
in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), with those countries with the lowest overall sum
of tariff barriers having the lowest price level. The results for the productivity
equations are very similar.
Turning to the long run of the model, 5.10 and 5.12 show the results of estimating
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the error correction model specifications on prices and productivity, respectively.
First we note that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is between zero
and one and highly significant, indicating that the error correction specification
is correct. There is little evidence of meaningful effects of trade barriers in the
long run, with the exception of a negative effect of foreign tariffs on the long
run price level in the domestic country, a finding that runs directly contrary to
the theory. Furthermore, the effect of market size is directly opposed to what
the theory predicts, with large and significant positive effects of domestic market
size on domestic inflation (and large negative effects on the level of productivity).
5.12 however can be seen to vindicate the different theoretical predictions for
short- and long run when viewed through the lens of market entry; columns (3),
(4), (5) and (6) show that the effects of lagged variables are much stronger and
the speed of mean reversion is much faster for those industries that are closer to
the free entry ideal, as the model would predict.
5.6 Discussion
The only empirical application of the Melitz–Ottaviano (2008) model to date
suggested that the long–run effects of trade liberalization are anti–competitive,
that is, there will be a reversal in any competitive gains as firms are allowed
to move to new markets. This chapter added to the evidence on the model’s
prediction by estimating the relationship between trade barriers, number of firms,
market size and prices as well as productivity. While the model’s predictions are
largely confirmed in the short run, the estimates for the long run behaviour of
aggregate variables provide little support for the reversion of the effect of trade
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barriers in the long run. Evidence in support of the theory presented here included
the role of third country trade barriers in shaping relative performance between
two trade partners, as well as a finding of stronger reactions to long run changes
in trade barriers by industries that have high turnover rates, therefore being close
to the model concept of free entry.
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5.7 Appendix A: Figures, Summary Statistics,
Results
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.8 Appendix B: Industries in sample, NAICS
classification
Table 5.4: Industry List, NAICS 4-digit
NAICS 4-digit code Industry
3111 Animal Food Manufacturing
3112 Grain and Oilseed Milling
3113 Sugar and Confectionery Product Manufacturing
3114 Fruit and Vegetable Preserving and Specialty Food Manufacturing
3115 Dairy Product Manufacturing
3116 Animal Slaughtering and Processing
3118 Bakeries and Tortilla Manufacturing
3119 Other Food Manufacturing
3121 Beverage Manufacturing
3132 Fabric Mills
3133 Textile and Fabric Finishing and Fabric Coating Mills
3149 Other Textile Product Mills
3152 Cut and Sew Apparel Manufacturing
3159 Apparel Accessories and Other Apparel Manufacturing
3169 Other Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing
3211 Sawmills and Wood Preservation
3212 Veneer, Plywood, and Engineered Wood Product Manufacturing
3219 Other Wood Product Manufacturing
3221 Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills
3222 Converted Paper Product Manufacturing
3231 Printing and Related Support Activities
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3241 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing
3251 Basic Chemical Manufacturing
3254 Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing
3255 Paint, Coating, and Adhesive Manufacturing
3256 Soap, Cleaning Compound, and Toilet Preparation Manufacturing
3259 Other Chemical Product and Preparation Manufacturing
3262 Rubber Product Manufacturing
3271 Clay Product and Refractory Manufacturing
3273 Cement and Concrete Product Manufacturing
3274 Lime and Gypsum Product Manufacturing
3279 Other Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
3312 Steel Product Manufacturing from Purchased Steel
3313 Alumina and Aluminum Production and Processing
3314 Nonferrous Metal (except Aluminum) Production and Processing
3315 Foundries
3321 Forging and Stamping
3322 Cutlery and Handtool Manufacturing
3323 Architectural and Structural Metals Manufacturing
3324 Boiler, Tank, and Shipping Container Manufacturing
3325 Hardware Manufacturing
3326 Spring and Wire Product Manufacturing
3327 Machine Shops; Turned Product; and Screw, Nut, and Bolt Manufacturing
3329 Other Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
3331 Agriculture, Construction, and Mining Machinery Manufacturing
3332 Industrial Machinery Manufacturing
3333 Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing
3334 Ventilation, Heating, Air-Conditioning, & Commercial Refrig. Eq. Manuf.
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3335 Metalworking Machinery Manufacturing
3336 Engine, Turbine, and Power Transmission Equipment Manufacturing
3339 Other General Purpose Machinery Manufacturing
3342 Communications Equipment Manufacturing
3344 Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing
3345 Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instrum. Manuf.
3351 Electric Lighting Equipment Manufacturing
3352 Household Appliance Manufacturing
3353 Electrical Equipment Manufacturing
3359 Other Electrical Equipment and Component Manufacturing
3362 Motor Vehicle Body and Trailer Manufacturing
3363 Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing
3371 Household and Institutional Furniture and Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturing
3372 Office Furniture (including Fixtures) Manufacturing
3379 Other Furniture Related Product Manufacturing
3399 Other Miscellaneous Manufacturing
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Table 5.5: Average percentile ranking of industries across papers reviewed, where
the industry at percentile 100 has the lowest turnover rate in a given paper.
Industry Average percentile
Food, beverages, tobacco 84
Chemical, Rubber, Plastics, Fuel 66
Paper and Printing 58
Other non-metallic mineral prod 56
Basic metals and fabricated metal prod 56
Textiles 52
Machinery and transport equipment 41
Manufacturing not else classified, recycling 29
Wood and Cork 22
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5.9 Appendix C: Regression Results
All regression tables have been autogenerated using the stargazer package
(Hlavac, 2004).







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ log τt 0.002 0.002 0.0002 0.004∗ 0.0001 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ log τ∗t −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.0005 −0.001 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ logDt −0.029 −0.027 −0.070∗∗ 0.032 −0.067∗∗ 0.033
(0.024) (0.023) (0.033) (0.045) (0.032) (0.044)
∆ logD∗t 0.104
∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.082∗ 0.347∗ 0.078∗ 0.212
(0.039) (0.036) (0.042) (0.185) (0.041) (0.153)
Observations 2,769 2,769 1,021 881 1,021 881
R2 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.008
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(1),(3): Fixed effects country-industry; (2),(4): Fixed effects country pair











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ log τhf −0.001 −0.001 −0.003 0.002 −0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
∆ log τfh 0.0002 0.0002 −0.0005 0.002 −0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ log τht 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005 0.007∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ log τth 0.002 0.002 0.004 −0.002 0.004 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ log τft −0.001 −0.001 0.00002 −0.002 0.00005 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ log τtf −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
∆ logDt −0.013 −0.013 −0.067∗ 0.074 −0.062∗ 0.072
(0.026) (0.025) (0.035) (0.048) (0.034) (0.046)
∆ logD∗t 0.093
∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.071∗ 0.404∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.295∗
(0.039) (0.037) (0.043) (0.205) (0.041) (0.167)
Observations 2,522 2,522 965 743 965 743
R2 0.023 0.022 0.028 0.044 0.027 0.040
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(1),(3): Fixed effects country-industry: (2),(4): Fixed effects country pair
With τ denoting tariff levels, D the number of firms serving the domestic
market. h is the domestic market, f the foreign market, and t the third market.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ log τt −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.018∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
∆ log τ∗t 0.006
∗ 0.006∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
∆ logDt 0.146∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.056 0.201∗∗∗ 0.051
(0.056) (0.054) (0.072) (0.118) (0.070) (0.114)
∆ logD∗t 0.015 0.035 −0.097 0.541 −0.095 0.716
∗
(0.089) (0.083) (0.091) (0.484) (0.088) (0.399)
Observations 2,695 2,695 990 860 990 860
R2 0.007 0.006 0.022 0.006 0.021 0.008
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(1),(3),(4): Fixed effects country-industry; (2),(5),(6): Fixed effect country pair
















∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.005 −0.016∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ log τ
fh
t −0.001 −0.001 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
∆ log τhtt 0.001 0.001 −0.0002 0.002 −0.0003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
∆ log τtht −0.005 −0.006 −0.002 −0.004 −0.002 −0.004




∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.007




∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
∆ logDt 0.176∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.063 0.223∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.058) (0.056) (0.075) (0.123) (0.073) (0.117)
∆ logD∗t 0.008 0.030 −0.104 0.525 −0.099 0.823
∗
(0.089) (0.084) (0.092) (0.523) (0.089) (0.427)
Observations 2,506 2,506 955 741 955 741
R2 0.022 0.021 0.042 0.011 0.041 0.013
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(1),(3),(4): Fixed effects country-industry; (2),(5),(6): Fixed effect country pair
With τ denoting tariff levels, D the number of firms serving the domestic
market. h is the domestic market, f the foreign market, and t the third market.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ log τt 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.005∗∗ −0.001 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ log τ∗t −0.001 0.00004 −0.00004 −0.002 0.0002 0.0004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ logDt −0.031 −0.025 −0.063∗∗ 0.008 −0.061∗∗ 0.023
(0.023) (0.021) (0.031) (0.041) (0.030) (0.040)
∆ logD∗t 0.038 0.028 0.038 0.366
∗∗ 0.036 0.132







−0.123∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
log τt−1 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.0003 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log τ∗t−1 −0.002 −0.00002 −0.0003 −0.006
∗∗∗ 0.0004 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
logLt−1 −0.570∗∗∗ −0.541∗∗∗ −0.497∗∗∗ −0.775∗∗∗ −0.480∗∗∗ −0.734∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.077) (0.136) (0.139) (0.131) (0.135)
logL∗t−1 0.466
∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.076) (0.132) (0.138) (0.126) (0.133)
Observations 2,769 2,769 1,021 881 1,021 881
R2 0.184 0.181 0.192 0.246 0.187 0.224
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Fixed effects for country pair
With τ denoting tariff levels, D the number of firms serving the domestic
market. In the long run, market size L replaces the number of firms D.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ log τ
hf
t −0.001 −0.001 −0.003 0.003 −0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
∆ log τ
fh
t 0.001 0.00001 0.00003 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ log τhtt 0.003
∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003 0.005∗ 0.003 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
∆ log τtht 0.001 0.0002 0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
∆ log τ
ft
t −0.001 −0.0002 0.001 −0.004 0.001 −0.002




∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
∆ logDt −0.013 −0.011 −0.054∗ 0.032 −0.050 0.046
(0.024) (0.023) (0.032) (0.041) (0.031) (0.040)
∆ logD∗t 0.028 0.019 0.032 0.415
∗∗ 0.034 0.093







−0.135∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
log τ
hf
t−1 0.00001 −0.001 −0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
log τ
fh
t−1 0.001 −0.0003 0.0002 −0.003 0.0003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
log τhtt−1 −0.0002 0.001 −0.0004 0.002 0.001 0.003
∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
log τtht−1 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.005
∗∗ 0.002 0.001




∗∗ −0.001 −0.0002 −0.006∗∗∗ 0.0002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
log τ
tf
t−1 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.00005
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
logLt−1 −0.682∗∗∗ −0.636∗∗∗ −0.435∗∗ −1.136∗∗∗ −0.426∗∗ −1.059∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.103) (0.191) (0.191) (0.176) (0.182)
logL∗t−1 0.684
∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗ 1.185∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.102) (0.182) (0.193) (0.171) (0.183)
Observations 2,522 2,522 965 743 965 743
R2 0.210 0.202 0.207 0.344 0.199 0.293
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Fixed effects for country pair
With τ denoting tariff levels, D the number of firms serving the domestic
market. In the long run, market size L replaces the number of firms D. h is
the domestic market, f the foreign market, and t the third market.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ log τt 0.0002 −0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ log τ∗t 0.001 0.004 −0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
∆ log θ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.042)
∆ log θ∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.131)
∆ logDt −0.428∗ 0.409∗ −0.179 0.262
(0.246) (0.221) (0.210) (0.208)
∆ logD∗t 0.336 −0.427 0.167 −0.175







−0.145∗∗∗ −0.348∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.308∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.022) (0.015) (0.033)
log τt−1 −0.008 −0.009∗ −0.007 −0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log τ∗t−1 0.006 0.013
∗∗ 0.0004 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log θt−1 −0.012 −0.092∗∗
(0.021) (0.043)
log θ∗t−1 −0.010 0.119
(0.021) (0.078)
logLt−1 0.569 −1.531∗∗∗ −0.523 −1.625∗∗∗
(0.623) (0.559) (0.539) (0.538)
logL∗t−1 −0.777 1.740
∗∗∗ 0.198 1.416∗∗∗
(0.636) (0.568) (0.547) (0.543)
logwt−1 0.160
∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.068 0.216∗∗
(0.063) (0.090) (0.058) (0.100)
logw∗t−1 −0.230
∗∗∗ −0.584∗∗∗ −0.063 −0.129
(0.069) (0.117) (0.062) (0.142)
Observations 324 324 320 320
R2 0.290 0.543 0.510 0.613
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Fixed effects for country pair or industry/country pair
With τ denoting tariff levels, D the number of firms serving the domestic
market. In the long run, market size L replaces the number of firms D.
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∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.004 0.016∗∗ 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
∆ log τ
fh
t −0.003 0.002 −0.009 −0.006 −0.006 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
∆ log τhtt −0.001 −0.005 −0.0005 0.004 −0.008 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
∆ log τtht −0.0003 0.002 −0.003 −0.004 −0.006 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
∆ log τ
ft
t −0.001 −0.004 0.001 −0.004 0.002 −0.009




∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.003 0.019∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
∆ logDt −0.059 −0.097∗ −0.096 −0.031 −0.129∗ −0.035
(0.048) (0.054) (0.060) (0.104) (0.070) (0.114)
∆ logD∗t 0.170
∗∗ 0.072 0.183∗∗ −0.460 0.168∗∗ −1.122∗∗







−0.399∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.437∗∗∗ −0.325∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗




∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.004 0.009 0.007




∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.021∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.008 −0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
log τhtt−1 −0.0001 0.004 −0.004 0.008 −0.004 0.014
∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
log τtht−1 −0.014
∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.001




∗∗∗ 0.002 0.012∗ 0.007 0.007 −0.001




∗∗∗ −0.002 0.017∗∗ −0.001 0.006 −0.014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
logLt−1 3.416
∗∗∗ 2.380∗∗∗ 3.536∗∗∗ 2.687∗∗∗ 3.176∗∗∗ 0.754
(0.206) (0.217) (0.320) (0.454) (0.358) (0.459)
logL∗t−1 −3.239
∗∗∗ −2.204∗∗∗ −3.419∗∗∗ −2.636∗∗∗ −3.095∗∗∗ −0.604
(0.207) (0.219) (0.323) (0.468) (0.358) (0.469)
logwt−1 0.143
∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.035
(0.019) (0.016) (0.030) (0.043) (0.026) (0.032)
logw∗t−1 −0.151
∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.065 0.065∗∗∗ 0.056∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.029) (0.047) (0.025) (0.033)
Observations 2,506 2,506 955 741 955 741
R2 0.378 0.126 0.433 0.354 0.168 0.124
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Fixed effects for country pair or industry/country pair
Fixed effects for country pair or industry/country pair
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With τ denoting tariff levels, D the number of firms serving the domestic
market. In the long run, market size L replaces the number of firms D. h is
the domestic market, f the foreign market, and t the third market.
5.10 Appendix D: Data Appendix
Tariffs (τ)
• Definition: All tariff data is downloaded from the World Integrated Trade
Solution (WITS), an online software package published by the World Bank
in collaboration with UNCTAD, the WTO, International Trade Center, and
the UN Statistical Division. WITS publishes annual trade and tariff data
from two different sources: the World Bank IDB database and the UNCTAD
TRAINS database. Unfortunately, neither database provides a complete time
series for each country that is devoid of erratic (and unexplained) jumps in
the data. Thus, we created a data set that uses mostly TRAINS preferential
tariff (PRF) data, but supplements it with observations from TRAINS or
WTO IDB applied tariffs (AHS) where appropriate (this choice will only
make a difference where there is no trade observed between countries and
hence no applied rate, but a preferential rate still exists). All tariff data is
reported according to ISIC Rev. 3.1 and converted to NAICS. This leads to
the following rules for construction for each country:
– Canada: TRAINS PRF from 1989 to 1995, WTO AHS from 1996 to
2014.
– Mexico: TRAINS AHS from 1989 to 1994, TRAINS PRF from 1995 to
2009.
– USA: TRAINS PRF from 1980 to 1996; WTO AHS for 1997 to 2014.
Prices (p)
• Definition: The Producer Price Index (PPI) measures the average change over
time in selling prices received by domestic producers of goods and services.
This measure contrasts with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) which measures
the price change from the perspective of the consumer.
• USA: Producer price index (PPI) reported by commodity and converted to
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) using the Bureau
of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) concordance table (1988-2014, 2003=100). All
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industries with more than one PPI reported (due to multiple commodities
matching the industry) are averaged. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
• Canada: Industrial product price indexes, by North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS), annual (index, 2003=100), Table 329-0077,
1993-2014. Industry price indexes, by industry and industry group (reported
according to SIC and converted to NAICS), annual (index, 1992=100), Table
329-0001, 1988-1992. Source: Statistics Canada.
• Mexico: Industrial producer price indices, total production by economic
activity (ISIC Rev. 2), monthly (index, December 2003=100), 1988-2012.
Monthly data are averaged to generate an annual price index, and ISIC
Rev. 2 is converted to NAICS. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y
Geografia.
Productivity (z)
• Definition: calculated as the ratio between real value-added and total
employment, by manufacturing sector.
• Value Added: Available for Canada (1990-2008, annually, millions of
current CAD) from the OECD SDBS database, Mexico (1988-2007, annually,
millions of current MXN) from the Annual Industrial Survey (Encuesta
Industrial Anual), which is published annually by the Instituto Nacional
de Estadistica y Geografia, and the U.S. (1988-2010, annually, millions of
current USD) from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (Becker,
Gray, and Marvakov, 2013). All value added data is converted into constant
2003 USD.
• Employment: Available for Canada (1990-2008, annually, ISIC Rev. 3)
from the OECD SDBS database, Mexico (1988-1990, 1993, annual average,
CMAP; 1994-1998, 2000-2007, annual average, ISIC Rev. 3.1) from the
Annual Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial Anual), which is published
annually by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia, and the U.S.
(1988-2010, annually, NAICS) from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry
Database (Becker, Gray, and Marvakov, 2013).
Number of Firms (D)
• Establishments: Available for Canada (1990-2008, ISIC Rev. 3.1) from
the OECD SDBS database, for Mexico (1988-1990, 1993, CMAP; 1994-
1998, 2000-2007, annual, ISIC Rev. 3.1) from the Annual Industrial Survey
(Encuesta Industrial Anual), which is published annually by the Instituto
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Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia, and the USA (1990-2010, NAICS)
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Canadian and Mexican data are
converted to NAICS using appropriate correspondence tables.
Market Size (L)
• Gross Domestic Product: Available for Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. (1988-
2014) in constant 2005 USD from the the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators.
Wages (w)
• Definition: Due to data availability, wages are calculated as the total wages
paid per employee.
• Total Wages: Available for Canada (1990-2008, ISIC Rev. 3.1, million
current CAD) from the OECD SDBS database, for Mexico (1988-1990, 1993,
CMAP; 1994-1998, 2000-2007, annual, ISIC Rev. 3.1, million current MXN)
from the Annual Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial Anual), which is
published annually by the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia, and
and the U.S. (1988-2010, NAICS, million current USD) from the NBER-
CES Manufacturing Industry Database (Becker, Gray, and Marvakov, 2013).
The Canadian and Mexican data are converted to NAICS using appropriate




This thesis considered the effects of heterogeneity in economic models both
theoretically and empirically. It reviewed the recent literature on the
macroeconomics of household consumption and savings with agents that
differ in their economic situation because of only partially insurable shocks
to their idiosyncratic income. After presenting the workhorse Aiyagari-
Bewley-Imrohoroglu- Huggett model of consumption under uncertainty, various
extensions to the model and their effects on the model’s predictions are discussed.
Amongst these are the introduction of additional assets such as housing, the
consideration of differing rates of return either because of different financial assets
or because of entrepreneurial activity, an overlapping generations structure with
bequest motives and institutional factors such as asset-based means testing for
public insurance program.
After noting that all models of the consumer wealth distribution rely on a
parsimonious AR(1) process with a persistent and transitory shock component, the
thesis moves on to consider the recent literature on estimating income processes
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from the variance-covariance structure of earnings residuals. While this literature
has a long tradition, recent work has renewed interest in the estimation of
processes in which the stochastic process for income features a deterministic trend
component which varies across households. Chapter 3 adds to this literature by
considering the so far longest sample of the US PSID to estimate such processes,
analyse their variation over time by considering sub-periods of the full sample and
for the first time estimating these processes from British data from the BHPS.
It documents substantial heterogeneity in the estimates obtained for different
time periods and income definitions, although a common theme in the obtained
estimates is that both the persistence of the AR(1) component and the variance of
its innovation are significantly lower than those estimated from processes without
deterministic growth rate heterogeneity.
Building on these findings, chapter 4 then used a life-cycle model of household
saving based on an heterogeneous income process in which households learn
about their individual specific intercept and slope parameter over the course of
their working life to simulate wealth distributions. It showed that while learning
is not important for the qualitative predictions of the model regarding the shape
of the wealth distribution, the key drivers in model fit are the persistence of
the AR(1) process and its innovation variance, precisely those parameters that
in chapter 3 were estimated to be significantly lower under a HIP specification.
The basic problem in fitting the model to the data is that the HIP process assigns
a large part of the variability in household earning to the dispersion in growth
rates, and a lower part to the permanent shock component. As permanent
growth, in contrast to persistent shocks, does not require asset accumulation for
consumption smoothing, the lifetime income inequality created by inequality in
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deterministic growth rates, does not lead to the large inequality in wealth holdings
that inequality created by a volatile and persistent shock component in income
does. As recent work points towards an HIP process as a good description of
the actual income risk facing households, the results of models offering a good
fit to the wealth distribution based on a persistent AR(1) component with large
innovation variance have to be questioned.
In chapter 5, the thesis then considers the effects of heterogeneity on the
supply side of the economy by testing the predictions of a model of international
trade based on firms differing in their marginal productivity levels. Based on a
sample of 64 industries in the three NAFTA member countries Canada, Mexico
and USA, error correction models relating changes in the growth rate of tariff
barriers, firms, and market size to changes in the growth rate of relative prices,
productivities and markups are being estimated on country pairs. In an extension
of the previous literature, the chapter also considers the effects of market entry by
constructing measures of firm turnover for each industry and analysing samples of
high- and low turnover industries separately, and considers the effects of third
country tariff barriers on two trade partners. It finds support for the model’s
prediction regarding the effect of entry condition, namely industries with free
entry displaying a larger reaction to changes in trade freeness in the long run,
as well as a faster speed of adjustment. The effects of third country tariffs are
absent in most specifications, a result that is likely to be due to the unfortunately
less than complete tariff data available for some parts of the sample.
Throughout the thesis it has become clear that heterogeneity has important
effects on the predictions of economic models and is crucially important when
applying these models for policy analysis. At the same time, heterogeneity can
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be added in a variety of ways, many of which often help to explain similar
patterns in the data. Here it is important to consider the effects of different
dimensions of heterogeneity simultaneously, to understand their interplay and
avoid ascribing too large a role quantitatively to one specific mechanism. As
computer power continues to grow, more and more complex models of differences
between economic agents will become feasible to solve, making heterogeneity in
economics a fruitful area for future research.
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